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TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION AND
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
Cassandra Burke Robertson*
Abstract: When U.S. corporations cause harm abroad, should foreign
plaintiffs be allowed to sue in the United States? Federal courts are increasingly saying no. The courts have expanded the doctrines of forum
non conveniens and prudential standing to dismiss a growing number of
transnational cases. This restriction of court access has sparked considerable tension in international relations, as a number of other nations view
such dismissals as an attempt to insulate U.S. corporations from liability. A
growing number of countries have responded by enacting retaliatory legislation that may ultimately harm U.S. interests. This Article argues that
the judiciary’s restriction of access to federal courts ignores important
foreign relations, trade, and regulatory considerations. The Article applies institutional choice theory to recommend a process by which the
three branches of government can work together to establish a more coherent court-access policy for transnational cases.

Introduction
In the summer of 2009, Chevron squarely faced the old adage “be
careful what you wish for.”1 Texaco, a company that would later merge
with Chevron, had successfully argued for dismissal of a large environmental case in 2001.2 Texaco argued that Ecuador was a more conven* © 2010, Cassandra Burke Robertson, Associate Professor, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to Jonathan H. Adler, Samuel P. Baumgartner, Jonathan
Entin, Peter Gerhart, Sharona Hoffman, Jacqueline Lipton, Lumen Mulligan, Gary Simson, David Shapiro, Christopher A. Whytock, the participants at the 2009 Junior Federal
Courts Conference, and the participants at the Northeast Ohio Faculty Colloquium for
valuable input and comments on earlier versions of this Article. Andrea Ball, Patricia
Schaal, and Jacob Wolf provided outstanding research assistance.
1 See Daniel Fisher, Careful What You Ask For, Forbes, July 13, 2009, at 92. See generally
W.W. Jacobs, The Monkey’s Paw (Books of Wonder 1997) (1902) (illustrating, through a
fictional horror story, the consequences of wishes coming true).
2 See Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also Cortelyou Kenney, Disaster in the Amazon: Dodging “Boomerang Suits” in Transnational Human Rights
Litigation, 97 Cal. L. Rev. 857, 858–63 (2009); Judith Kimerling, Indigenous Peoples and the
Oil Frontier in Amazonia: The Case of Ecuador, ChevronTexaco, and Aguinda v. Texaco, 38
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 413, 474–84 (2006) (analyzing the facts giving rise to the environmental litigation).
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ient forum and better suited to hear the case, which had arisen from
actions taken in Ecuadorian territory.3 By moving for dismissal under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, Texaco seemed to make a wise
strategic choice: plaintiffs rarely re-filed cases dismissed under forum
non conveniens,4 and even when they did, damages in courts outside
the United States tended to be significantly lower.5
In this case, however, a series of events converged to make the
choice less strategically sound than it appeared at the outset.6 First, in
2003, the plaintiffs did re-file the suit in Ecuador,7 armed with the defendant’s agreement to accede to jurisdiction in Ecuador and bolstered
by the defendant’s own court filings praising the Ecuadorian court system.8
Second, Ecuador, like many Latin American countries, objected to
the U.S. practice of discretionarily dismissing cases in the absence of
any jurisdictional barrier.9 Ecuador follows a civil law tradition that al3 Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
4 David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A Rather Fantastic
Fiction,” 103 L.Q. Rev. 398, 418–20 (1987) (concluding after empirical study that only
eighteen percent of personal injury plaintiffs and twenty percent of commercial plaintiffs
re-filed cases abroad after forum non conveniens dismissals). Defendants in other cases
have also engaged in strategies that make sense only by assuming that a dismissal for forum
non conveniens would end the case. See, e.g., Nowak v. Tak How Invs., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708,
720 (1st Cir. 1996). In Nowak, the defendant sought dismissal by arguing that the plaintiff
could better enforce the judgment in Hong Kong. See id. As one scholar has noted, “Saying, ‘No, please sue me where you have some chance of collecting my money if you win,’
only makes sense if you know that your bluff is unlikely to be called.” Martin Davies, Time to
Change the Federal Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 309, 351 (2002).
5 See Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis of
Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 31 (2002).
6 See infra notes 7–18 and accompanying text.
7 Kimerling, supra note 2, at 629.
8 Ben Casselman, Chevron Expects to Fight Ecuador Lawsuit in U.S.: As Largest Environmental Judgment on Record Looms, the Oil Company Reassures Shareholders It Won’t Pay, Wall St.
J., July 21, 2009, at B3.
9 Ronald A. Brand & Scott R. Jablonski, Forum Non Conveniens: History,
Global Practice, and Future Under the Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements 128, 133–34 (2007) (discussing the effort in Latin America to create laws that
will make U.S. courts less willing to dismiss suits by Latin American plaintiffs). Although
Latin American countries have been especially vocal in their opposition to forum non
conveniens, others, including attorneys in the United States, have also criticized the doctrine for allowing a trial judge’s discretion to overrule the will of Congress. See, e.g., Hu
Zhenjie, Forum Non Conveniens: An Unjustified Doctrine, 48 N. Ir. L. Rep. 143, 159–60
(2001); Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133
U. Pa. L. Rev. 781, 781 (1985) (describing a hypothetical situation in which a lawyer explains to a client that “we served the defendant with a summons at its place of business . . .
[and sued] in one of the places in which Congress in the venue statute said a defendant
may be sued, [and] persuad[ed] the court that our choice of forum was reasonable under
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lows plaintiffs to bring suit in the defendant’s home forum.10 Allowing
U.S. judges to discretionarily dismiss cases against U.S. corporations
contravenes this strong sociolegal tradition and gives rise to the criticism that the forum non conveniens doctrine operates as a “tool to escape liability,” denying foreign plaintiffs the advantages of the U.S. federal court system.11
Third, as a result of frustration with the U.S. courts’ failure to respond to these concerns about the forum non conveniens doctrine, the
Latin American Parliament (Parlatino)12 drafted a “Model Law on International Jurisdiction and Applicable Law to Tort Liability.”13 The
model law, which was widely accepted by Latin American countries,
permits national courts to award damages comparable to what a U.S.
court would award in an international tort case, specifying that “the
national court may, at the plaintiff’s request, apply to damages and to
the pecuniary sanctions related to such damages, the relevant standards
and amounts of the pertinent foreign law.”14
These three factors combined to produce a bad result for Chevron
when the case was tried in Ecuador.15 An expert retained by the trial
court recommended a judgment of twenty-seven billion dollars—an
amount that, if accepted by the judge, would be the largest award for
environmental damage ever awarded against an oil company.16 Chevron
is challenging the Ecuadorian court’s action in U.S. courts, but its ability
to do so is hampered by its earlier argument that Ecuador, not the

the due process clause of the Constitution,” but the judge nevertheless decided that that
the forum was not appropriate).
10 Brand & Jablonski, supra note 9, at 128.
11 See id. at 129. Ecuadorians may have found the denial of court access to be particularly galling, as Ecuador had signed on to the Peace, Friendship, Navigation, and Commerce Treaty with the United States, which provides for “open and free” access to U.S.
courts. Id. at 129–30 (specifying that such advantages include: “liberal discovery rules;
proximity to the assets of U.S. corporate defendants; perceived higher damage awards;
punitive damages; jury trials; favorable products liability laws; the contingent fee system;
and the lack of a loser-pays rule for attorney fees”).
12 Parlatino is an organization comprising members of Latin American legislatures.
Michael Wallace Gordon, Forum Non Conveniens Misconstrued: A Response to Henry Saint Dahl,
38 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 141, 176 (2006).
13 Brand & Jablonski, supra note 8, at 132–33.
14 Id. Professor Russell Weintraub, professor emeritus at the University of Texas Law
School, describes such statutes as telling defendants: “You want to try the case here. Welcome. You will be sorry.” Fisher, supra note 1, at 93.
15 See Casselman, supra note 8, at B3.
16 60 Minutes: Amazon Crude (CBS News television broadcast May 3, 2009)(transcript
available at cbsnews.com).
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United States, was the appropriate forum in which to resolve the case.17
In order to prevail in the United States, Chevron would have to demonstrate that the Ecuadorian justice system was incompatible with due
process requirements—a difficult argument to make after asking a U.S.
court to dismiss the case in favor of an Ecuadorian forum in 2001.18
Although Chevron’s difficulty may indeed be a “self-inflicted injury,”19 it showcases larger issues that heretofore have only been addressed in a piecemeal and contradictory fashion.20 U.S. courts draw
litigants worldwide, but to what extent should those courts be open to
foreign plaintiffs? Academic scholarship has long noted the “magnet
effect” of U.S. courts, and scholars have debated whether efforts should
be taken to demagnetize U.S. courts.21 In recent years, federal judges
have been taking a lead in limiting access to U.S. courts by aggressively
enforcing and expanding the doctrine of forum non conveniens.22 The
effort to limit access was recently taken to the logical extreme in 2009,
in Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., in which the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia simply held that foreign plaintiffs lack prudential standing to sue in U.S. courts for harms suffered abroad.23
What happens, however, when an effort to push transnational litigation out of U.S. courts meets retaliatory legislation aimed at making
17 See Ben Casselman & Chad Bray, Ecuador Seeks To Block Chevron, Wall St. J., Dec. 5–6,
2009, at B6.
18 See Fisher, supra note 1, at 93. The enforcement of foreign judgments is largely governed by state law. Soc’y of Lloyd’s v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 993 (10th Cir. 2005). The
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgment Recognition Act, which has been widely adopted, provides that a foreign judgment need not be enforced if “the judgment was rendered under
a system that does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law” or is otherwise “repugnant to the public policy of [the
enforcing] state.” Id. (citing the Act as adopted by New Mexico). For a discussion of the
possible application of collateral estoppel or judicial estoppel to prevent a defendant who
successfully moved for forum non conveniens from later objecting to the enforcement of
the resulting judgment, see Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Retaliatory Legislation: The Impact on the Available Alternative Forum Inquiry and on the Desirability of Forum Non
Conveniens as a Defense Tactic, 56 U. Kan. L. Rev. 609, 641–42 (2008).
19 See Fisher, supra note 1, at 92.
20 See Gary B. Born & Peter B. Rutledge, International Civil Litigation in
United States Courts 368–73, 377–80 (4th ed. 2007) (“[T]he forum non conveniens doctrine rests on unarticulated and unexamined substantive assumptions.”).
21 Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 29 Tex. Int’l
L.J. 321, 352 (1994) [hereinafter Weintraub, International Litigation] (“The United States is
a magnet forum for the afflicted of the world.”); Russell J. Weintraub, The United States as a
Magnet Forum and What, if Anything, to Do About It, in International Dispute Resolution:
The Regulation of Forum Selection 213 ( Jack L. Goldsmith ed., 1997) [hereinafter
Weintraub, Dispute Resolution].
22 Weintraub, Dispute Resolution, supra note 21, at 225–31.
23 658 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D.D.C. 2009).
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foreign courts more hospitable for claims against U.S. corporate defendants? This Article argues that ad hoc judicial efforts to limit court
access may backfire as foreign courts begin to award large judgments
against U.S. defendants.24 A more coherent court-access policy is sorely
needed.
Determining what that court-access policy should look like, however, requires examining the question of who should decide. Which
court-access questions are best resolved by Congress or the executive,
and which should remain with the judiciary?25 Despite the criticism leveled against current court-access doctrine, many have assumed that
judges will remain the architects of future court-access policies.26 This
focus on the judiciary as the agent of change, however, is at odds with
the larger academic move toward comparative institutional analysis.27
Comparative institutional choice requires analyzing not only the legal
rules themselves, but also who should make them: which institution is
the most appropriate vehicle for legal reform?28 Although a few scholars have recommended extrajudicial changes, this Article is the first to
undertake a comparative institutional choice analysis of the courtaccess doctrines.29
Part I examines the magnetic effect of U.S. courts, which draw foreign plaintiffs through generous discovery, higher damages, and contingent fee representation.30 This Part analyzes the growing judicial reaction to this magnetic effect.31 At the extreme, judges may deny pru24 See infra notes 88–101 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 212--278 and accompanying text.
26 See, e.g., Elizabeth T. Lear, National Interests, Foreign Injuries, and Federal Forum Non
Conveniens, 41 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 559, 602–03 (2007); Note, Cross-Jurisdictional Forum Non
Conveniens Preclusion, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 2178, 2195–99 (2008); Emily J. Derr, Note, Striking
a Better Public-Private Balance in Forum Non Conveniens, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 819, 841–48
(2008); Finity E. Jernigan, Note, Forum Non Conveniens: Whose Convenience and Justice?, 86
Tex. L. Rev. 1079, 1120–21 (2008); Leah Nico, Note, From Local to Global: Reform of Forum
Non Conveniens Needed to Ensure Justice in the Era of Globalization, 11 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am.
345, 360–62 (2005).
27 See infra notes 212-278 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 212-278 and accompanying text.
29 See, e.g., E.E. Daschbach, Where There’s a Will, There’s a Way: The Cause for a Cure and
Remedial Prescriptions for Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in Latin American Plaintiffs’ Actions
Against U.S. Multinationals, 13 Law & Bus. Rev. Am. 11, 65 (2007) (recommending the
creation of a new international tribunal to hear transnational tort cases); Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Jurisdiction and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation:
Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 Tex. Int’l L.J. 501, 518, 524–28
(1993) (recommending a federal statute that would limit foreign plaintiff access to U.S.
courts in cases where claims arise outside of the United States).
30 See infra notes 46–78 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 56–78 and accompanying text.
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dential standing to foreign plaintiffs; more commonly, however, judges
will invoke their discretionary power to dismiss foreign plaintiffs’ cases
through the doctrine of forum non conveniens.32 In light of these access
restrictions, this Part then examines the emerging international backlash against the dismissal of cases involving U.S. defendants, as other
nations—particularly in Latin America—adopt strategies intended to
deter such dismissals by making their own courts appear to be a less attractive option for U.S. defendants.33
Part II argues that the judge-made court-access doctrines have expanded beyond their initial prudential focus, as they implicate substantive economic, regulatory, and foreign relations policy interests.34 In
this Part, I argue that the competing components of these access doctrines must be openly acknowledged and evaluated.35 The prudential
component serves the goals of fair and efficient adjudication, while the
policy strand promotes substantive economic and political goals.36 The
judiciary has been inconsistent, and often contradictory, about what
the court-access doctrines are intended to accomplish, frequently conflating the various policy and prudential goals.37 This inconsistency has
led to doctrinal confusion over questions such as whether the trial
judge’s discretion allows for retention of cases, whether a foreign plaintiff may choose to foreclose a formerly available foreign forum, and
whether there is a state or national interest in regulating the conduct of
U.S corporations abroad.38 Until the separate underpinnings of these
court-access doctrines are acknowledged, the doctrines will serve neither the prudential goals nor the policy goals successfully.39
Part III applies institutional choice theory to analyze the relative
institutional competence of each of the three branches in developing a
more coherent court-access policy.40 Section A articulates both prudential and policy goals for a court access doctrine.41 On the prudential
side, I suggest that the doctrine should promote predictability and uniformity of application.42 On the policy side, I argue that the doctrine
32 See infra notes 56–78 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 79–101 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 102–211 and accompanying text.
35 See infra notes 102–211 and accompanying text.
36 See infra notes 102–211 and accompanying text.
37 See infra notes 102–211 and accompanying text.
38 See infra notes 102–211 and accompanying text.
39 See infra notes 102–211 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 212–278 and accompanying text.
41 See infra notes 217–225 and accompanying text.
42 See infra note 217 and accompanying text.
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should be sensitive to the foreign relations impact of dismissals, regulate
U.S. defendants’ conduct abroad, take advantage of the opportunity to
export American due process values, and provide an effective mechanism for corrective justice.43 Section B examines how the three branches
of government can work to realize these goals.44 Finally, Section C recommends that reform begin with Congress, which should articulate an
initial court-access policy, then turn to the executive branch to negotiate
bilateral treaties and multilateral court-access conventions, and conclude with the judiciary having a more limited role in applying these
policies to individual cases.45
The time has come for U.S. institutions to coordinate a more effective court-access policy. The doctrines regulating foreign plaintiffs’
access to U.S. courts have long been confused, contradictory, and ineffective. As long as dismissal represented a “win” for U.S. corporate defendants, there was previously little incentive for them to support reform of court-access doctrines. Now, that may change: with other countries beginning to impose draconian remedies against U.S. defendants
in transnational cases, the moment is right for marshalling support
within the United States to enact a more coherent court-access policy.
I. The United States as a Magnet Forum
U.S. courts are highly attractive to foreign plaintiffs for several reasons. First, compensatory damages tend to be higher in the United
States than abroad, and many cases also carry the possibility of recovering punitive damages.46 Second, the United States allows lawyers to
bring cases on a contingent fee basis, so that plaintiffs do not risk having to pay significant attorneys’ fees if they lose the case.47 Discovery is
also more widely available than in foreign courts, offering plaintiffs ac43 See infra notes 218–225 and accompanying text.
44 See infra notes 226–268 and accompanying text.
45 See infra notes 270–278 and accompanying text.
46 Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730, 733 (C.A. 1982) (“As
a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only get
his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.”); Stephens, supra note 5, at 31
(“Comparative studies of damage awards find not only that U.S. awards are much higher
than those in any other country, but also find great disparities even within Europe and ‘a
pattern of low awards’ in jurisdictions where ‘the standard of living is low and the economy
underdeveloped.’ Moreover, amounts are much lower even in the more prosperous countries outside of Europe, such as Japan.”).
47 Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 1.5(c)–(d) (2009) (prohibiting lawyers from
collecting contingent fees only when they represent a defendant in a criminal case or in
certain domestic relations matters).
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cess to the evidence they need to prove their case.48 Finally, class action
litigation is also widely available, encouraging litigation even in cases
where individual damages are likely to be small.49
The “magnet effect”50 of the U.S. courts is enhanced by a sociolegal expectation, present especially in Latin American civil law countries, that a defendant can reliably be sued in its home forum.51 Discretionary dismissal is virtually unknown in civil law systems; instead, jurisdiction in civil law countries is based on the “belief in the predictability
of comprehensive procedure codes created by the legislature and the
absence of all but minimal discretion in the role of the judge.”52 Thus,
the civil law countries largely require the first court seised with jurisdiction to hear the case.53 This process is combined with a strict rule of lis
pendens, which provides that once a case has been filed in a competent
court, no other court can have jurisdiction over it.54
Accustomed to justice systems with a long tradition of basing jurisdiction on the defendant’s residence, foreign plaintiffs may be surprised and dismayed to learn that U.S. courts can dismiss cases against
U.S. corporate defendants under the assumption that the plaintiff’s
home forum is a more convenient choice.55
A. Common Law Court-Access Doctrines
Although foreign plaintiffs desire—and expect—to be able to sue
U.S. defendants in U.S. courts, the courts themselves are increasingly
resisting such suits and limiting foreign plaintiffs’ access to the federal
courts.56 At the extreme, one court has recently held that foreign plain48 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 n.18 (1981) (“[D]iscovery is more extensive in American than in foreign courts.”); Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman,
Civil Procedure Reform in Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 Am. J. Comp. L.
675, 678 (1997) (“Both inside and outside the United States, American pretrial has been
criticized for encouraging ‘easy’ pleadings (i.e., statements of claim and defense) and
‘broad’ discovery . . . .”).
49 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (detailing class action procedure).
50 Weintraub, Dispute Resolution, supra note 21, at 213.
51 Brand & Jablonski, supra note 9, at 128.
52 Id. at 121.
53 Id.
54 Martine Stückelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens at the Hague Conference, 26
Brook. J. Int’l L. 949, 950–51, 958–59 (2001).
55 Zhenjie, supra note 9, at 159–60. Foreign plaintiffs may also view such dismissals as a
tool to insulate U.S. corporations from liability. Id. at 159 (“US courts have in fact been
manipulating the doctrine to . . . prevent the application of the plaintiff-favouring rules to
foreign plaintiffs . . . . ‘[P]laintiff-favoring rules of liability and damages’ are applied exclusively to the local plaintiffs.”).
56 Id. at 159–60.
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tiffs simply lack standing to sue for harms occurring outside the country unless there is a specific exception granted by Congress or the Constitution.57 Under this view, U.S. courts are a scarce resource that the
judiciary must jealously guard.58 Non-resident aliens presumably have
recourse to their home courts and should be expected to sue there.59
At this point, only one U.S. district court has expanded the prudential standing doctrine to categorically deny foreign plaintiffs access to
U.S. courts, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit may yet reverse the decision.60 Yet judges commonly apply the
doctrine of forum non conveniens to dismiss such cases. The doctrine
of forum non conveniens operates on a case-by-case basis, rather than
categorically requiring dismissal.61 It allows a district judge to dismiss a
case “‘when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear [the] case, and
. . . trial in the chosen forum would establish . . . oppressiveness and
vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience, or . . . the chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court’s own administrative and legal problems.’”62
When the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the doctrine of forum non
conveniens,63 it set forth a number of “private interest” and “public in57 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 658 F. Supp. 2d 131, 134–35 (D.D.C. 2009).
58 See id. (“[W]here a non-resident alien ‘is harmed in his own country, he cannot and
should not expect entitlement to the advantages of a United States court.’”) (quoting Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp. 144, 152 (D.D.C. 1976)).
59 Berlin Democratic Club, 410 F. Supp. at 152 (“[T]he rationale for permitting a resident
alien access to United States courts is ‘an implied assurance of safe conduct’ in this country. No similar assurance is or need be given to a citizen of a foreign country, who is not
subjected to the laws of this country and who can utilize the laws of his own country to
protect himself.”).
60 See Julian Ku, A Completely New Standing Argument Against the Alien Tort Statute, Opinio
Juris (Oct. 18, 2009, 22:26 EST), http://opiniojuris.org/2009/10/18/a-completely-newstanding-argument-against-the-alien-tort-statute/ (predicting reversal of Doe). Interestingly,
Judge Royce Lamberth was the judge in Doe and the defense attorney seeking dismissal in
Berlin Democratic Club. See Doe, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 132; Berlin Democratic Club, 410 F. Supp. at
147.
61 Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Cal. L. Rev. 380, 387–
88 (1947); John Bies, Conditioning Forum Non Conveniens, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 489, 497–98
(2000); Robert Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 908, 912 (1947);
Douglas W. Dunham & Eric F. Gladbach, Forum Non Conveniens and Foreign Plaintiffs in the
1990s, 24 Brook. J. Int’l L. 665, 667 (1999).
62 Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429 (2007) (quoting
Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 447–48 (1994)). As discussed in Part II, however,
district courts have sometimes dismissed cases even when these requirements are not met.
63 Dunham & Gladbach, supra note 61, at 668–69. The Court initially adopted the doctrine in the context of domestic litigation (allowing dismissal in favor of another federal
court). Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 510-12 (1947) (finding New York to be an
inconvenient forum compared to Virginia); Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S.
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terest” factors that courts should consider in deciding whether to dismiss. On the private side, it included the availability of evidence and
witnesses, the costs of trial, the enforceability of the ultimate judgment,
and the plaintiffs’ motivation in choosing the forum.64 On the public
side, it mentioned the crowdedness of the docket, the potential need to
call jurors from a community with little relationship to the litigation,
and the familiarity of the court with governing law.65
At the outset, the Court did not trouble itself too much with how,
exactly, these factors should be evaluated.66 As a result, the motivating
policy behind a forum non conveniens dismissal depends very much
on the worldview of the judge deciding the motion.67 Truly easy cases
rarely require a forum non conveniens analysis, as a federal court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction when all the factors point to dismissal: if no
party is a U.S. citizen, and if the case does not arise under federal law,
then there is no subject matter jurisdiction in federal court.68 Thus,
cases that turn on forum non conveniens are necessarily cases in which
these factors point in different directions.69 Perhaps the case may be
unrelated to the forum, but the forum court’s docket may nevertheless
be less crowded than most, allowing the case to be heard quickly.70 Or
witnesses may be difficult to obtain, but U.S. law may govern the case
and any judgment may be easily enforceable in the United States.71
Thus, ruling on a forum non conveniens motion requires the judge to
not only balance competing facts, but also to balance competing policies: is docket control more important than the plaintiffs’ convenience?72 Does the risk of offending another country’s government by
518, 531-32 (1947) (finding New York to be an inconvenient forum compared to Illinois).
The current venue statute, however, allows transfer among federal district courts for convenience and therefore renders the doctrine unnecessary in domestic federal litigation. 28
U.S.C. § 1404 (2006); Sinochem Int’l Co., 549 U.S. at 430 (“The common-law doctrine of
forum non conveniens ‘has continuing application [in federal courts] only in cases where the
alternative forum is abroad,’ and perhaps in rare instances where a state or territorial
court serves litigational convenience best.”).
64 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
65 Id.
66 See id. at 507–09 (describing the history and workings of the doctrine).
67 See id.
68 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (2006). Of course, a case with only foreign parties may still
be heard if the case arises under federal law, including cases arising under statutes such as
the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006), or the Class Action Fairness
Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1, 1332(d), 1453, 1711–1715 (2006).
69 See Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508–09.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See id.
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dismissing a case brought by its citizens outweigh the inconvenience
imposed on local citizens who must sit on a jury for a case with no connection to their community?73 And, although not officially part of the
analysis, the judge’s thoughts about contingent-fee cases, American
damage awards, and the tort system in general will influence how the
judge weighs those competing policies.74
Thus, the forum non conveniens doctrine leaves the difficult decision to the trial judge, who must decide for him- or herself how to
weigh the competing considerations and decide whether to retain the
case or dismiss it.75 The Supreme Court acknowledged the high level of
discretion given to the trial judge, noting that “it has not been attempted to catalogue the circumstances which will justify or require
either grant or denial of remedy,” and that “[t]he doctrine leaves much
to the discretion of the court to which plaintiff resorts.”76 The Court
did suggest that close cases should be resolved in favor of the plaintiff:
“[U]nless the balance [of private interest factors] is strongly in favor of
the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.”77 But ultimately, the Court offered a fairly vague standard,
suggesting that trial judges should choose the forum “where trial will
best serve the convenience of the parties and the ends of justice.”78
B. “Demagnetizing” Policies and International Retaliation
Given the magnetic effect of U.S. courts and the discretion given to
trial judges to dismiss cases, scholars like Professor Russell Weintraub
have identified a need to “demagnetize” U.S. courts.79 Weintraub, a wellknown expert in international litigation, suggests that magnet forums
may have a responsibility to “examine their rules and procedures and
73 See id.
74 See David W. Robertson, The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: “An Object Lesson
in Uncontrolled Discretion,” 29 Tex. Int’l L.J. 353, 360–62 (1994); Louise Weinberg, Insight
and Ironies: The American Bhopal Cases, 20 Tex. Int’l L.J. 307, 316–17 (1985).
75 Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 508.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Koster, 330 U.S. at 527.
79 See Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Arbitration: Practice and Planning 224 (5th ed. 2006). But see Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum
Shopping System, 96 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010) (presenting empirical evidence
“suggesting that there actually has been less, not more, transnational forum shopping into
U.S. courts over the last two decades,” and concluding that “new anti-forum-shopping
measures may not be as appropriate or urgent as their advocates suggest—particularly in
light of the potential costs of such measures”), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1596280.
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modify those that are luring claimants from forums that are more appropriate for adjudicating the matters in dispute[.]”80 Professor Weintruab has recommended changing choice-of-law rules to demagnetize
U.S. courts, so that foreign tort victims’ compensation would be calculated by reference to the prevailing standard in their home country.81
In the absence of such a choice-of-law regime, however, it is not
surprising that judges turn to the tools more immediately at hand to
repel foreign lawsuits—in particular, the judicial doctrines of prudential standing and forum non conveniens.82 Although categorical exclusion through the doctrine of prudential standing is an extreme demagnetizing policy, expansion of the forum non conveniens doctrines
is a much more common one.83 Two decades ago, a scholar reported
that the federal courts were experiencing a “dramatic increase in the
use of forum non conveniens in the last twenty years,” going from approximately 25 published decisions per decade to or over 100 per decade, or approximately 10 per year.84 Transnational forum non conveniens cases have continued that dramatic increase, going up to approximately forty-three published decisions per year85—a 400% increase over
a time period in which civil filings as a category rose only 22%.86 The
courts have dismissed in approximately half of the most recent cases.87
Because a growing number of foreign nations object to the growth
of such dismissals, they have begun adopting retaliatory blocking stat80 See Weintraub, supra note 79.
81 Russell J. Weintraub, Choice of Law for Products Liability: Demagnetizing the United States
Forum, 52 Ark. L. Rev. 157, 163 (1999).
82 See Sinochem Int’l Co., 549 U.S. at 429–30; Doe, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 135.
83 Weintraub, International Litigation, supra note 21, at 352 (“The United States is a
magnet forum for the afflicted of the world. The costs of litigating here are lower and the
recovery is higher. Subjecting United States defendants to suit here by foreigners injured
abroad places our companies at a world-wide competitive disadvantage. . . . Forum non
conveniens furthers efficient and fair use of our judicial resources.”).
84 Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access Doctrine, 133
U. Pa. L. Rev. 781, 831 (1985).
85 Christopher A. Whytock, Politics and the Rule of Law in Transnational Judicial
Governance: The Case of Forum Non Conveniens 15–16, available at http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969033.
86 Responding to the Growing Need for Federal Judgeships: The Federal Judgeship Act of 2009:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (testimony by George Singal, J., U.S. District Court for the
District of Maine).
87 See Whytock, supra note 85, at 16 (reporting a forty-seven percent dismissal rate). A
review of reported district court cases in 2009 confirmed that just over forty percent of the
cases were dismissed. See id. at 17, 31. Of these cases, courts dismissed cases involving foreign plaintiffs suing U.S. defendants at a notably higher rate than cases involving U.S.
plaintiffs suing foreign defendants. See id. at 23.
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utes.88 Many of these statutes, enacted primarily in Latin American
countries with civil law systems, attempt to prevent forum non conveniens dismissals in the United States.89 The statutes generally provide
that, once a plaintiff has filed suit in a foreign court with jurisdiction,
the home country’s court loses jurisdiction.90 Although this is a restatement of the general principle of lis pendens followed in civil law
countries, countries enacted the statutes to make clear that their courts
should not be considered an alternative forum supporting dismissal
under forum non conveniens.91 Thus, a foreign plaintiff who files first
in a U.S. court may, by this choice, foreclose jurisdiction in his or her
home forum—a forum that would have been available had the plaintiff
sued there initially, but is no longer available once suit is filed in a U.S.
court possessing jurisdiction over the case.92 This aspect of the statute is
designed to discourage dismissal from U.S. courts by sending the message that “if transnational cases are dismissed [from the U.S.], the foreign national-plaintiff may never have relief.”93
Defendants themselves may not care if the foreign plaintiff obtains
relief. Of presumably greater concern to U.S. defendants, however, is
that some blocking statutes add a provision that acts as a poison pill:
such provisions allow the national courts to take jurisdiction over cases
dismissed from U.S. courts, but impose additional disadvantages on
defendants that “tilt the scales of justice in the plaintiffs’ favor.”94 These
statutes may, like the one described in the introduction, allow courts to
assess damages at U.S. levels—and, like the twenty-seven billion dollar
recommendation in Ecuador, may estimate U.S. damage law more generously than U.S. courts would.95 Statutes may also require U.S. defendants to post a significant bond, such as 140% of the damages awarded

88 Bernard H. Oxman, Comments on Forum Non Conveniens Issues in International Cases,
35 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 123, 128 (2004); see also Winston Anderson, Forum Non
Conveniens Checkmated?—The Emergence of Retaliatory Legislation, 10 J. Transnat’l L. & Pol’y
183, 184 (2001); Paul Santoyo, Comment, Bananas of Wrath: How Nicaragua May Have Dealt
Forum Non Conveniens a Fatal Blow Removing the Doctrine as an Obstacle to Achieving Corporate
Accountability, 27 Hous. J. Int’l L. 703, 724–26, 735–36 (2005).
89 Heiser, supra note 18, at 621–34; Henry Saint Dahl, Forum Non Conveniens, Latin
America and Blocking Statutes, 35 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 21, 22–24 (2003).
90 See Santoyo, supra note 88, at 725.
91 Saint Dahl, supra note 89, at 25–31.
92 See Santoyo, supra note 88, at 725.
93 M. Ryan Casey & Barrett Ristroph, Boomerang Litigation: How Convenient Is Forum Non
Conveniens in Transnational Litigation?, 4 BYU Int’l L. & Mgmt. Rev. 21, 29 (2007).
94 Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1324 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
95 See supra notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
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in similar cases, or may presume causation in tort cases, requiring the
defendant to prove that its action did not cause the alleged harm.96
Federal courts react to blocking statutes in different ways; some
will accept them at face value and retain a case, while others will ignore
them.97 Thus, the use of forum non conveniens dismissals to “demagnetize” U.S. courts raises a number of unresolved issues: it is not clear
whether such a policy will actually be effective at pushing litigation into
other countries’ courts and whether, in the long run, U.S. defendants
might find themselves facing greater hardships in defending cases outside the U.S. than at home. As such, the benefits of a demagnetizing
policy may outweigh its detriments.98
Given the domestic confusion and international reaction to the
forum non conveniens doctrine, it seems apparent that, although forum non conveniens plays a growing role in controlling court access, it
is not serving well as a primary court-access determinant.99 Nevertheless, few academics have examined the doctrine’s role in the larger
question of access to federal court.100 The next Part analyzes courtaccess doctrines more generally, separating the prudential and policy
goals that animate the doctrines and arguing that these conflicting
goals create chaos, unpredictable rulings, and inefficient judicial administration.101
II. Problematic Judicial Court-Access Doctrines
Most court-access restrictions stem from constitutional or legislative sources: the Constitution sets the outer boundaries of both personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction,102 and Congress has
created additional limitations on subject matter jurisdiction and venue,
while deferring to additional state-made limitations on personal jurisdiction.103 But judge-made court-access limitations are not uncom96 Heiser, supra note 18, at 656–57.
97 Casey & Ristroph, supra note 93, at 30–31.
98 See id.
99 See id. at 26–31.
100 For two notable exceptions that do address forum non conveniens as part of the
larger issue of court access, see Jeffrey A. Van Detta, Justice Restored: Using a Preservation-ofCourt-Access Approach to Replace Forum Non Conveniens in Five International Product-Injury Case
Studies, 24 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 53, 60 (2003) (citing the “shared underpinnings” of forum non conveniens with legislative jurisdiction and the modern theory of personal jurisdiction), and Stein, supra note 84, at 831.
101 See infra notes 102–211 and accompanying text.
102 U.S. Const., art. III; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 741–47 (1877).
103 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391, 1331, 1332 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k).
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mon.104 The judiciary developed the doctrine of prudential standing,
for example, to avoid wasting court time on cases where no individual
rights would be vindicated and to ensure that “those litigants best
suited to assert a particular claim” would be the ones heard in court.105
These judicial restrictions on court access are typically instrumentalist in that they seek to ensure the smooth functioning of the courts.
Specifically, they are intended to promote better decision making, conserve judicial resources, and minimize conflicts between the branches
of government.106 Thus, for example, prudential doctrines prohibit a
litigant from “raising another person’s legal rights,” forbid suits based
on “generalized grievances,” and require that the plaintiff’s complaint
“fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.”107 In
adopting these limitations, the judiciary pays heed to the idea of comparative institutional competence: as the U.S. Supreme Court has
noted, these prudential access rules offer a mode of judicial selfgovernance, without which “the courts would be called upon to decide
abstract questions of wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.”108
Many of the commonly stated goals of forum non conveniens fit
well with other common law doctrines of judicial restraint and deference.109 The discretionary dismissal power protects judicial functioning
by combating plaintiffs’ abuse of process,110 guarding overcrowded
dockets from the incursion of cases unrelated to the forum,111 and de-

104 See Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979) (discussing the
judge-made doctrine of prudential standing).
105 Id.; see also Jeffrey Kahn, Zoya’s Standing Problem, or, When Should the Constitution Follow the Flag?, 108 Mich. L. Rev. 673, 673 (2010) (critiquing the “strange but proliferating”
test of standing).
106 Joshua L. Sohn, The Case for Prudential Standing, 39 U. Mem. L. Rev. 727, 728 (2009)
(“[T]he Court has noted how the ‘constitutional’ standing requirements improve judicial
decision-making, conserve judicial resources, and reduce conflict between the judiciary
and the political branches. These are all worthy goals, but they are prudential goals, related to wise and efficient judicial administration.”).
107 Id. at 732 (quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004)).
108 Elk Grove, 542 U.S. at 12.
109 See infra notes 110–112 and accompanying text.
110 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947) (noting that some plaintiffs may
seek “not simply justice but perhaps justice blended with some harassment”).
111 Heine v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 50 F.2d 382, 387 (9th Cir. 1931) (stating that the court
has “the power to prefer resident litigants of the district in access to overcrowded calendars”).
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ferring to the competence of foreign courts through considerations of
comity.112
But even from an early time, the forum non conveniens doctrine
has not been limited to these prudential goals; instead, it also captures
broader policy considerations that could be affected by court access.113
By assertively dismissing non-forum-related cases, for example, courts
favor taxpayers whose dollars support court operations.114 On the other
hand, when broad court access would encourage business and commercial considerations, the courts are less likely to apply the forum non
conveniens doctrine—thus showing deference to substantive economic
goals.115 Other policies informally influence the forum non conveniens
analysis, as dismissing courts sometimes express distaste for contingentfee lawyers and for foreign plaintiffs who seek higher damage awards
than their own countries would be willing to award.116
Excluding foreign plaintiffs based on standing similarly evokes both
prudential and policy considerations.117 By excluding a particular class
of litigants, the doctrine indeed reduces the administrative burden of

112 Id. (“Comity between the United States and Germany should also have consideration.”); Universal Adjustment Corp. v. Midland Bank, Ltd., 184 N.E. 152, 159 (Mass. 1933)
(“In determining whether to entertain jurisdiction of a cause as matter of comity, courts
undertake to recognize a state of friendliness and reciprocal desire to do justice existing
between nations and between the several States of the Union.”).
113 See Stephen B. Burbank, Jurisdictional Equilibration, the Proposed Hague Convention and
Progress in National Law, 49 Am. J. Comp. L. 203, 212 (2001) (“Ostensibly a tool to implement litigation convenience for litigants and courts, as formulated by the Supreme Court
in the 1940’s, forum non conveniens doctrine invited attention to regulatory concerns,
and hence to choice of law, through consideration of what the Court called ‘public interest
factors.’”); see also Alexandra Wilson Albright, In Personam Jurisdiction: A Confused and Inappropriate Substitute for Forum Non Conveniens, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 351, 398 (1992) (“In making
decisions about forum non conveniens, the state is making public policy decisions that
affect the state’s economy as well as the influence that the state’s laws may have in foreign
countries.”).
114 See Barrett, supra note 61, at 404; see also One Hundred & Ninety-Four Shawls, 18 F.
Cas. 703, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1848) (No. 10,521) (concluding that courts should not prioritize
cases involving litigants “owing no allegiance to its laws, and contributing in no way to its
support”).
115 See Barrett, supra note 61, at 405 (noting that New York would allow dismissal for
forum non conveniens in tort actions but not in commercial actions, because in commercial actions “presumably some benefit will ultimately accrue to the state through encouraging the use of its courts in the furtherance of business activities”).
116 Heine, 50 F.2d at 387 (noting that the court “no doubt had inherent power to protect itself from a deluge of litigation by nonresidents, inspired by contingent retainers to
avoid or overcome foreign laws and interpretation and application thereof by foreign
courts of the country of the situs of the contract”).
117 See Kahn, supra note 105, at 673.
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the courts.118 But the policy questions are even more central: by adopting such a doctrine, the court is also affecting economic, political, and
regulatory interests in ways that may have substantial ramifications.119
The next Section argues that the competing components of these
access doctrines must be openly acknowledged and evaluated.120 The
prudential component serves the goals of fair and efficient adjudication,
while the policy strand promotes substantive economic and political
goals.121 The judiciary itself has been inconsistent and often contradictory about what the court access doctrines are intended to accomplish.122
Until the separate underpinnings of these court-access doctrines are acknowledged, the doctrines will serve neither the prudential nor the policy goals successfully.
A. Does the Trial Judge’s Discretion Allow for Retention of Cases?
Acknowledging the tension between prudential and policy goals
would help define the limits of the district court’s power. At this time, it
is unclear where the limits on discretion fall: specifically, may a judge
retain a case on the docket even when the forum non conveniens factors are clearly met? Certainly, the judge would have discretion to dismiss the case when the factors are met. But would the judge also have
discretion to retain the case?
Separating the prudential and policy considerations of the doctrine is critical to answering this question. If the prudential considerations are paramount, then the judge should indeed possess such discretion; after all, the judge is in the best position to consider the administrative impact of retaining such a case. If, on the other hand, we expect
the doctrine to also further substantive policy goals, then retaining the
case would make no sense: unlike prudential concerns that one can
reasonably address on a case-by-case basis, meeting policy goals requires
a stable system in which dismissals can reasonably be predicted.
One reason for this lack of clarity regarding the retention power is
that appellate courts are rarely asked to address a district judge’s refusal
118 See id. at 718–19 (noting that denying prudential standing for foreign-based takings
claims may reduce “court clog,” but only at risk of “creat[ing] an arbitrary device to exclude plaintiffs with legitimate claims” and potentially threatening the property interests of
aliens abroad).
119 See infra notes 123–142 and accompanying text.
120 See infra notes 123–142 and accompanying text.
121 See infra notes 123–142 and accompanying text.
122 See Born & Rutledge, supra note 20, at 369 (“[T]he forum non conveniens doctrine
rests on unarticulated and unexamined substantive assumptions.”).
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to dismiss under forum non conveniens. It is clear that a decision to
dismiss may be reviewed by higher courts under an “abuse of discretion”
standard: if the factors do not weigh in favor of dismissal, the district
court’s decision to dismiss is a final judgment that will be reversed for
abuse of discretion.123 A decision denying a motion to dismiss, however,
is more difficult to review: because the decision to retain a case is not a
final order, it is not immediately appealable as of right.124 Moreover, if
the defendant does raise the issue after a trial on the merits, many of the
factors supporting a forum non conveniens dismissal will have become
moot: whatever inconvenience the parties and court would have suffered from trying the case in a particular forum becomes a sunk cost
after trial.125 Remanding the case for retrial in a more convenient forum
would only add to the overall expense and delay of the case.126
Because of the rarity of such appeals, a district judge’s decision to
retain a case is rarely disturbed—even when it conflicts with other
judges’ decisions. Thus, at a minimum, district judges possess “reviewlimiting” discretion to retain cases; that is, “there may be law constraining the trial court’s decision, but there will be [almost] no appellate
review of that decision—such discretion ‘gives the trial judge a right to
be wrong without incurring reversal.’”127
123 See, e.g., Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 429–30
(2007) (reviewing a dismissal under forum non conveniens); Synygy, Inc. v. ZS Assocs.,
Inc., No. 08–2355, 2009 WL 1532117, at *2–3 (3d Cir. June 1, 2009) (concluding that the
district court failed to properly evaluate the availability of the alternative forum); Adelson
v. Hananel, 510 F.3d 43, 52–54 (1st Cir. 2007) (concluding that the district court afforded
too much weight to concurrent litigation ongoing in Israel and that it provided insufficient deference to the plaintiff’s choice of forum).
124 Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1998). Interlocutory review may be
available by mandamus or through 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)(2006) in exceptional cases. Id. at
529–30. In addition, a right of interlocutory appellate review could be granted through the
rulemaking process under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e)(2006).
125 See Zelinski v. Columbia 300, Inc., 335 F.3d 633, 643 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The fact that
the district court tried this case to a conclusion indicates that Zelinski’s forum of choice
was, if not convenient for Columbia, at least workable. Furthermore, at this point the public interest certainly would not be well-served by deciding to jettison the untold hours of
work put into this case . . . .”); see also Demenus v. Tinton 35, Inc., 873 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir.
1989) (suggesting that a forum non conveniens motion “fails to survive the mooting effect
of the actual litigation of the suit in the putative inconvenient forum”). But see Gonzalez v.
Naviera Neptuno A.A., 832 F.2d 876, 881 (5th Cir. 1987) (reversing, even after trial, the
lower court’s judgment which had denied a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens
grounds, and transferring the case to Peru).
126 See Zelinski, 335 F.3d at 643.
127 Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judging Jury Verdicts, 83 Tul. L. Rev. 157, 202 (2008)
(quoting Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from Above, 22 Syracuse L. Rev. 635, 638 (1971)).
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But a more difficult question is whether the district judge also possesses “decision-liberating” discretion to retain a case even when the
factors would easily permit dismissal. That is, is the court “free to render the decision it chooses” in such an instance?128 The U.S. Supreme
Court’s typical phrasing of the forum non conveniens doctrine states
that
a federal court has discretion to dismiss a case on the ground
of forum non conveniens “when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear [the] case, and . . . trial in the chosen forum
would establish . . . oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience, or . . .
the chosen forum [is] inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court’s own administrative and legal problems.”129
What is unclear, however, is whether the “discretion” identified by the
Court means that the judge could, in such instances, choose either to
retain or dismiss.
Conventional wisdom leans toward a substantive view of the doctrine, suggesting that a defendant may have a right to dismissal even if
the trial judge were willing to keep the case.130 Under this view, if the
stated forum non conveniens factors are satisfied, then a judge’s decision to retain the case would be an abuse of discretion.131 At one level,
this makes sense: if the factors truly weigh heavily in favor of permitting
dismissal, then what reason could the court have for retaining jurisdiction?132 And if indeed the court has no good reason for retaining jurisdiction, but simply does so arbitrarily or capriciously, then the court
would certainly be abusing its discretion.133

128 Id. (quoting Rosenberg, supra note 127, at 638).
129 Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 429.
130 See Gonzalez, 832 F.2d at 881.
131 See id. (“[W]e conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in denying
Neptuno’s motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens. Consequently, the judgment must
be reversed. Both private and public interests weigh heavily in favor of a Peruvian forum,
applying Peruvian law.”); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India,
809 F.2d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[I]t might reasonably be concluded that it would have
been an abuse of discretion to deny a forum non conveniens dismissal.”).
132 See Gonzalez, 832 F. 2d at 881.
133 See Richards v. United Mine Workers Health & Ret. Fund, 895 F.2d 133, 135–36 (4th
Cir. 1990) (“Although the ‘abuse of discretion’ standard is perhaps broader and less deferential than the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard, ‘arbitrary and capricious’ definitely is
encompassed by ‘abuse of discretion.’”).
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On the other hand, the source of the dismissal power supports the
view that prudential considerations should control, and that the judge
may indeed have such power.134 Unlike personal jurisdiction, which has
constitutional underpinnings,135 or venue limitations, which are codified in statute,136 authority for the forum non conveniens doctrine is
based on the court’s “inherent power.”137 As other commentators have
noted, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that such inherent power
should be strictly interpreted, “suggesting that the inherent power extends only to those instances ‘necessary to permit the courts to function.’”138 It may be that the courts need the forum non conveniens doctrine to function—specifically, to protect their dockets from cases that
have little connection to the forum and can be more easily resolved
elsewhere. But if so, a court’s decision not to exercise that outlet in a
particular case should be respected—even if the case would otherwise
fit the paradigm for dismissal under forum non conveniens.
Thus, when both the Constitution and Congress would permit a
court to exercise jurisdiction, the court may reasonably decide to retain
a case that would otherwise qualify for dismissal under forum non conveniens.139 Even if the case has little connection to the forum, the court
may believe that it can still manage its docket while hearing the case,
and may reasonably defer to Congress’s choice to allow jurisdiction.140
If the power to dismiss a case under forum non conveniens is truly
based on the court’s inherent power, then it is not unreasonable to view
134 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (“In addition, it is firmly established that ‘[t]he power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts.’ This power
reaches both conduct before the court and that beyond the court's confines . . . . Of particular relevance here, the inherent power also allows a federal court to vacate its own
judgment upon proof that a fraud has been perpetrated upon the court.” (citations omitted)).
135 See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 741–47.
136 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2006).
137 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (“There are other facets to a federal court’s inherent
power. The court may bar from the courtroom a criminal defendant who disrupts a trial. It
may dismiss an action on grounds of forum non conveniens, and it may act sua sponte to dismiss a suit for failure to prosecute.”) (citations omitted); see also Elizabeth T. Lear, Congress,
the Federal Courts, and Forum Non Conveniens: Friction on the Frontier of the Inherent Power, 91
Iowa L. Rev. 1147, 1159–66 (2006); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal
Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735, 743 (2001).
138 Lear, supra note 137, at 1160 (quoting Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils
S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 819–20 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)).
139 See Lear, supra note 137, at 1160–62.
140 See id. Indeed, some scholars have argued that deference to Congress is required,
and that current forum non conveniens doctrine impermissibly encroaches on areas of
exclusive Congressional control. See id. and sources cited therein.
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such power as a one-way safety valve: the court may override Congress’s
grant of jurisdiction when, under its inherent power, the court finds
dismissal to be necessary; if the court concludes that it can function
without such a dismissal, however, it is not obligated to dismiss even
when it would have authority to do so.
It might be reasonable to defer to the judge’s retention power, but
this view is far from universal. Although most decisions to retain cases
evade appellate review, a few courts have reached out, either through
interlocutory review before trial or even post-trial, to hold that a court
abuses its discretion by retaining a case eligible for forum non conveniens dismissal.141 These courts thus treat the doctrine as a substantive
one that protects defendants’ rights, rather than a prudential doctrine
that protects the functioning of the courts.142
B. May a Foreign Plaintiff Intentionally Foreclose an
“Adequate Alternative Forum”?
The prudential-policy distinction is also apparent when courts
must decide how to address the effects of plaintiffs’ forum choices. The
prudential side of the doctrine allows a court to decide which of two
available courts is better suited to hear the case. What happens, however, when the plaintiff could have filed suit in a more appropriate forum, but chose not to and thereby “closed” the formerly available forum? At this point, the U.S. court no longer has the ability to choose
between two forums—the prudential option of sending the case to a
better decisionmaker is closed.143 All that is left is the policy question:
should the court dismiss the case to incentivize future plaintiffs to make
141 See Gonzalez, 832 F.2d at 881 (reversing, even after trial, the lower court’s judgment
which denied a motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds and transferring the
case to Peru); see also Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d at 202 (“[I]t might reasonably be concluded that it would have been an abuse of discretion to deny a forum non conveniens
dismissal.”).
142 Nalls v. Rolls-Royce, Ltd., 702 F.2d 255, 260 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) (stating that forum non conveniens protects “the right
not to be tried in an unreasonably inconvenient forum,” and comparing it to the “district
court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds”); Christina Melady
Morin, Note, Review and Appeal of Forum Non Conveniens and Venue Transfer Orders, 59 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 715, 729 (1991) (“Both forum non conveniens and venue transfer protect
the defendant from proceeding to trial in an unreasonably inconvenient forum.”).
143 Saint Dahl, supra note 89, at 22–24. As discussed further in this Section, alternative
forums might become unavailable for different reasons: civil law countries may divest jurisdiction of other courts after a case has been filed in a court possessed of jurisdiction,
and the statute of limitations may be shorter in one forum than in another. See supra notes
155–165 and accompanying text.
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more appropriate forum choices, even though the current plaintiffs
have no such option?
The discord over this question arises from a changing conception
of the role that the “alternative forum” concept should play in a forum
non conveniens analysis.144 Originally, the doctrine was conceived as a
way to steer cases away from a vexatious or abusive forum and into a
more convenient one.145 Courts later transformed it into a doctrine
aimed at choosing the most suitable forum, regardless of whether the
original forum was vexatious or not.146 Using the doctrine to shape litigant forum choice at the outset would effect an even more fundamental change, transforming the forum non conveniens doctrine from one
that merely steers litigation to an appropriate forum into one that attempts to regulate litigant behavior.
This shift has not fully taken hold; the traditional view, which requires that the adequate alternative forum actually be available at the
time of dismissal, is still prominent at this time.147 If the statute of limitations is likely to be a problem in the alternative forum, courts following this doctrine often condition dismissal on the defendant’s willingness to waive it.148 Because the traditional view requires that an alternative forum be available to take the case, it does not inquire into the

144 See infra notes 145–181 and accompanying text.
145 See Robertson, supra note 4, at 404–05.
146 Id.
147 See Crimson Semiconductor, Inc. v. Electronum, 629 F. Supp. 903, 909 (S.D.N.Y.
1986) (“Many cases have held that statute of limitations bars arising after the instigation of
a lawsuit preclude a forum non conveniens dismissal. Yet our research uncovers only one case
discussing the adequacy of a forum in which the claim would have been stale when
brought.”); Born & Rutledge, supra note 20, at 415 (“The weight of authority . . . imposes
an absolute requirement that an adequate alternative forum exist.”); Heiser, supra note 18
at 624 (“Under the traditional common law doctrine set forth in [Gulf Oil] and [Piper
Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981)] and followed in federal and most state courts, a
court must first ascertain whether an adequate alternative forum is available when determining whether a forum non conveniens dismissal is appropriate. If the law in the alternative country prohibits jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim when the plaintiff first files in
another country with competent jurisdiction, then the alternative forum is simply not
available to the plaintiff.”); Rajeev Muttreja, Note, How To Fix the Inconsistent Application of
Forum Non Conveniens to Latin American Jurisdiction—And Why Consistency May Not Be Enough,
83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1607, 1638 (2008).
148 14D Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 3828.3 (3d ed. 2007) (“A motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens will not be granted unless the district court is convinced that an alternative
forum exists in which the action can be brought.”).
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reasons for a forum’s unavailability.149 Thus, under the traditional view,
blocking statutes that preclude jurisdiction abroad would be effective: a
statute destroying all other jurisdiction as soon as the case is filed in a
court of proper jurisdictionthe statutes would be considered in the
dismissal analysis, and the U.S. court would keep the case if it concludes that, in light of the statute, there is no alternative forum.150
Nevertheless, a modern trend is emerging in which a growing
number of courts will dismiss a case—even in the absence of an alternative forum—when it appears that the foreign forum is unavailable as a
result of plaintiffs’ early choices in litigation.151 In the 2005 U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit case In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.,
for example, a district court had declined to hear a tort case against a
U.S. corporation, concluding that Mexico was an adequate alternative
forum.152 The plaintiff, however, had also filed suit in Mexico, and a
Mexican court had dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.153 The
Seventh Circuit remanded the case, holding that the district court
should inquire into the nature of that dismissal: if the plaintiffs had
acted in bad faith by purposefully filing in the wrong Mexican state,
then the district court should feel free to dismiss for forum non conveniens, as “a forum may not become unavailable by way of fraud.”154
The enactment of blocking statutes significantly increases the likelihood that courts will have to decide what effect to give to the plaintiff’s initial forum choice.155 When another’s country’s statute attempts
to limit its own courts’ jurisdiction in an effort to shift the litigation to
the United States, U.S. courts must decide how to react: accept the limitation and hear the case, or reject the limitation and refuse the case?
149 See Heiser, supra note 18, at 626 (“The relevant inquiry under the current forum
non conveniens analysis is whether an alternative forum is in fact available, not why the alternative forum is unavailable.”).
150 See id.
151 See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 420 F.3d 702, 703 (7th Cir. 2005); VebaChemie A.G. v. M/V Getafix, 711 F.2d 1243, 1248 n.10 (5th Cir. 1983) (“Perhaps if the
plaintiff’s plight is of his own making—for instance, if the alternative forum was no longer
available at the time of dismissal as a result of the deliberate choice of an inconvenient
forum—the court would be permitted to disregard [the available forum requirement] and
dismiss. As we have pointed out, forum non conveniens is sensitive to plaintiff’s motive for
choosing his forum, at least in the extreme case where his selection is designed to ‘vex,
harass, or oppress the defendant.’”).
152 420 F.3d at 703.
153 Id. at 705.
154 Id. at 707.
155 See Oxman, supra note 88, at 128; see also Anderson, supra note 88 at 184 (2001);
Santoyo, supra note 88, 724–25 (2005).
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Federal courts have gone both ways.156 Courts may view such statutes as
an encroachment on their judicial power,157 but a judicial rejection of
the foreign statutes would extend well beyond the judicial sphere, affecting foreign relations and regulatory goals.158
Even in the absence of a blocking statute, plaintiffs’ litigation
choices may foreclose an alternative forum and require the court to
make a decision about whether to allow access to the U.S. court.159 For
example, in In re Compania Naviera Johnna S.A., decided in 2007 by the
United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, the
plaintiff deliberately chose not to file suit in China, knowing that the
Chinese statute of limitations would expire before the U.S. court ruled
on the forum non conveniens motion.160 The district court decided
that dismissal was appropriate even though the Chinese forum was no
longer available to the plaintiff, stating that “[i]f a plaintiff (or other
party opposed to forum non conveniens dismissal) purposefully foreclosed the availability of an alternative forum, that conduct would certainly be in the realm of vexation, harassment, or oppression.”161
District courts have also occasionally allowed dismissal when the
alternative forum was lost due to mere inaction rather than a particular
intent to preclude a forum non conveniens dismissal.162 In the 2001
case of Gamara v. Alamo Rent a Car in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of New York, Canadian plaintiffs sued a number of defendants, including a U.S. car rental company.163 The district court, in
dismissing for forum non conveniens, noted the expiration of the Candian statute of limitations meant that a Canadian forum was no longer
available to the plaintiff, but nonetheless concluded that because the
claims “could have been brought in Canada,” Canada was an adequate
alternative forum.164 Similarly, in 1985 in Castillo v. Shipping Corp. of In156 Casey & Ristroph, supra note 93, at 30.
157 Hal S. Scott, What to Do About Foreign Discriminatory Forum Non Conveniens Legislation,
49 Harv. Int’l L.J. Online 95 (2009) (“[C]ourts would be succumbing to efforts to manipulate their jurisdiction. . . . [T]he United States should not reward foreign plaintiffs
with U.S. jurisdiction when a country passes laws that discriminate against U.S. companies.”).
158 See infra notes 182--209 and 217--225 and accompanying text.
159 In re Compania Naviera Joanna S.A., 531 F. Supp. 2d 680, 686 (D.S.C. 2007).
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 See, e.g., Gamara v. Alamo Rent a Car, No. 99-Civ-411, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1146, at
*1 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2001); Castillo v. Shipping Corp. of India, 606 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
163 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1146, at *1–2.
164 Id. at *4.
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dia, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York stated that “[t]he plaintiff had a most convenient forum, the Dominican Republic. But, through his own inaction, he lost access to it.
He let the Dominican Republic’s six-month statute of limitations pass
and has lost his remedy there.”165
Thus, courts are in fundamental disagreement about whether they
should take into account the reason for a forum’s unavailability in deciding whether to dismiss.166 Like the question of a district court’s power
to retain a case when the factors warrant dismissal,167 the answer to this
question depends on which of the theoretical strands underlying the
forum non conveniens doctrine—prudence or policy—is paramount.
Specifically, is the doctrine one that can, or should, shape conduct? Or
is the doctrine merely a prudential and adjudicatory one, making the
best forum choice only after the plaintiffs have played their hand?168
Allowing the forum non conveniens doctrine to play a larger regulatory role is attractive to judges who wish to reduce the magnet effect
of U.S. courts.169 If plaintiffs understand that, by choosing to file suit in
the United States, they may be foreclosing other options, then they will
be forced to determine whether the risk of dismissal in the United
States outweighs a lower recovery in a more appropriate forum.170 If
the alternative forum truly offers the possibility of recovery (even if at a
lower rate), then economic theory would suggest that the pull of the
United States would diminish as some plaintiffs conclude that the risk
of dismissal in the United States outweighs the lower recovery they may
see in the alternate forum.171
In order to make a rational-choice calculation, however, litigants
would need to have accurate information about the risk of dismissal in

165 Castillo, 606 F. Supp. at 503–04.
166 See supra notes 143–165 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 123–142 and accompanying text.
168 See Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, and Organizations: A Legal Theory
for a Bureaucratic Society 124 (1985) (describing a regulatory model of adjudication
that focuses on the lawsuit’s “impact on the future conduct of others” and an arbitration
model that focuses on “settling disputes between private parties”)(quoting Kenneth E.
Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 937, 938 (1975)).
169 See supra notes 79--101 and accompanying text.
170 See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the
Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1051, 1055 (2000).
171 Id. (“To speak coherently of the legal implications of viewing law as a series of incentives, analysts have to make assumptions about the consequences of those incentives to
the people subject to the legal system.”).
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a U.S. court.172 Yet right now, as the Supreme Court has pointed out,
the doctrine is applied far too inconsistently for any such calculation to
be made, suggesting that forum non conveniens—at least under current practice—is incapable of effectively regulating litigants’ behavior.173 In the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1994 decision in American Dredging
Co. v. Miller, Justice Scalia wrote that “forum non conveniens cannot really
be relied upon in making decisions about secondary conduct—in deciding, for example, where to sue or where one is subject to being sued.”174
The Court referenced the great discretion that district judges have in
deciding whether to dismiss, combined with the “multifariousness of
the factors relevant to its application.”175 In doing so, the Court concluded that these issues “make uniformity and predictability of outcome almost impossible” and mean that “one can rarely count on the
fact that jurisdiction will be declined.”176
The Supreme Court’s statement that a litigant cannot “count on” a
decision declining jurisdiction is at odds with certain lower court decisions, where courts have held that a plaintiff should have foreseen a
forum non conveniens dismissal and, therefore, should be held accountable for their decision not to file suit elsewhere—even if that
means that they lose their opportunity to bring suit at all.177 The statement also conflicts with a commentator’s suggestion that malpractice
liability could arise from a lawyer’s failure to predict that a U.S. court
would dismiss for forum non conveniens178—if, as suggested above, the
trial judges always maintain discretion to retain a case, then predicting
dismissal would be speculative at best.179
Without such predictability, forum non conveniens cannot act as an
effective demagnetizing mechanism. It may well be that court-access policy should not include demagnetization as a goal.180 But if it is a goal,
172 Id. at 1084 (“In a world in which the consequences of most decisions are, to some
degree, uncertain, actors can maximize the expected utility of a given decision only if their
judgments are based on accurate perceptions of the likelihood that specific choices will
lead to various possible outcomes.”).
173 See American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994).
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Oxman, supra note 88, at 129 n.12 (“An attorney may be liable for malpractice for
advising a plaintiff to sue in the United States without considering the possibility of a forum non conveniens dismissal in the United States notwithstanding blocking statutes or
similar rules overseas.”).
179 See supra notes 123–142 and accompanying text.
180 See supra notes 217–225 and accompanying text.
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then it will be necessary to sacrifice some of the discretionary nature of
the dismissal decision and, instead, develop a legal doctrine more capable of standardization and subject to review by appellate courts.181
C. Is There a National Interest in Adjudicating the Conduct of Domestic
Corporations Abroad?
The expansion of the prudential standing and forum non conveniens doctrines also raises the question of whether—or to what extent—
the U.S. has an interest in adjudicating the conduct of domestic corporations abroad.182 Courts applying both doctrines have suggested that
there is no such interest, and thus no countervailing policy consideration that would weigh against a dismissal based on administrative convenience. This view is shortsighted.
As currently applied, the forum non conveniens doctrine requires
courts to consider the interests of both the target forum and the potential alternative forum in the subject matter of the lawsuit.183 This inquiry is similar to the one undertaken in the choice-of-law context,
where courts must decide whether the U.S. regulatory interest allows
U.S. law to be applied.184 In cases brought by foreign plaintiffs against
181 See supra notes 212–275 and accompanying text.
182 See infra notes 183–209 and accompanying text. Although this Section focuses on
national interests, other scholars have convincingly argued that federal judicial courtaccess policies have also ignored individual state regulatory interests. See Elizabeth T. Lear,
Federalism, Forum Shopping, and the Foreign Injury Paradox, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 87, 141
(2009) (“[F]ederal judicial oversight of international forum shopping is incompatible with
the critical goals of American federalism. Simply put, the forum non conveniens regime
interferes with the states’ ability to govern.”); Stein, supra note 84, at 843.
183 Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 241 n.6. Courts consider the “local interest in having localized controversies decided at home.” Id. (quoting Gulf Oil, 330 U.S. at 509). Courts also
consider “the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.” Id.
184 Walter W. Heiser, Forum Non Conveniens and Choice Of Law: The Impact of Applying Foreign Law in Transnational Tort Actions, 51 Wayne L. Rev. 1161, 1179 (2005) (“[M]uch of the
interest-balancing undertaken for purposes of forum non conveniens is similar to the
analysis required by many modern choice-of-law doctrines. For example, when a trial court
compares the deterrence and the regulatory interests of the country in which a defendant
manufacturer resides versus those of the country where the injured plaintiff resides for
purposes of forum non conveniens, that process of identifying and assessing respective
interests is not unlike a government interest choice-of-law analysis.”); Allan R. Stein, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: Seeing Due Process Through the Lens of Regulatory Precision, 98
Nw. U. L. Rev. 411, 416–417 (2004) (“The act of interpreting and applying a legal standard is an important aspect of providing a legal rule. Where a state’s legislature may provide a general standard of conduct, the state’s judges and juries give particular meaning to
that standard through adjudication. Issuance of a judgment, whether exonerating or imposing liability on a defendant, affects the primary behavior of people. It is part of the way
a state crafts a legal order. Accordingly, both jurisdiction and choice of law advance a
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U.S. defendants in U.S. courts, these public interest factors take on
added significance. Because the defendant corporations are sued in
their home country, the private interest convenience factors weigh less
heavily, as it is questionable how much inconvenience U.S. corporate
defendants face in litigating in their home country.185 Thus, analysis of
the public interest factors assumes greater significance—but not, unfortunately, greater consistency.
In order to weigh the public interest factors, courts must decide
what the United States’ interest is in cases involving lawsuits brought by
foreign plaintiffs for the conduct of U.S. corporations in their countries. Jurisprudence in this area has been particularly inconsistent and
unclear.
One view is that “injuries done by American businesses to foreign
nationals abroad are not America’s problem.”186 Although it is not clear
how many judges subscribe to this view, it has been clearly articulated
on occasion: one judge, for example, has asked “why the American justice system should undertake to punish American corporations more
severely for their actions in a foreign country than that country
does?”187 Indeed, a number of courts have quickly brushed aside the
suggestion that a corporate defendant’s home base has a significant
interest in its actions abroad.188 Even the U.S. Supreme Court, in its
1981 decision in Piper Aircraft v. Reyno, was unpersuaded that the United
States’ interest in deterring the sale of harmful products outweighed
state’s regulatory interest.”); Christopher A. Whytock, Myth of Mess? International Choice of
Law in Action, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 719, 723–25 (2009).
185 See Tech. Dev. Co. v. Onischenko, 174 Fed. Appx. 117, 122 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Most forum non conveniens cases involve a defendant, sued far from home, arguing against being
forced to litigate in a remote forum. Here, by contrast, Onischenko was sued in his own
forum and is arguing that it would be more convenient for him to defend himself thousands of miles away.”); Monegro v. Rosa, 211 F.3d 509, 513 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[F]oreign
plaintiffs seeking to avoid their home forums by filing in the United States do not typically
sue in a forum with little or no relation to either the defendant or the action. Indeed, foreign plaintiffs typically bring such suits in the quintessentially convenient forum for the
defendant—the defendant’s home forum.”); Robertson, supra note 4, at 405 (“[I]t should
ordinarily be impossible for such a defendant [sued at home] to make a credible claim of
vexation or harassment.”); see also Alejandro M. Garro, Forum Non Conveniens: “Availability”
and “Adequacy” of Latin American Fora from a Comparative Perspective, 35 U. Miami Inter-Am.
L. Rev. 65, 99 (2003–2004) (“[I[f there is a forum that can hardly be deemed ‘inconvenient’ to the defendants, that is the court of their own home.”).
186 Robertson, supra note 4, at 405.
187 Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 707 n.11 (Tex. 1990) (Hecht,
J., dissenting).
188 See Piper Aircraft, 454 U.S. at 260–61; Villar v. Crowley Mar. Corp., 780 F. Supp. 1467,
1485 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (“[B]eyond the general fact that CMC does business in Texas, the
State of Texas has no interest in this case . . . .”).

2010]

Transnational Litigation & Institutional Choice

1109

Scotland’s interest in a products liability case where the harm occurred
in Scotland.189
Another view, however, is that “injuries done by American businesses to foreign nationals abroad” clearly are “America’s problem”
when those injuries create economic and political consequences that
resonate within the United States.190
1. Economic Interests
Contrary to the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Piper Aircraft,
scholars have concluded that the United States does have a strong interest in deterring the sale of harmful products abroad—at least when
the case involves liability for a product or activity also present in the
U.S. market.191 If the U.S. tort system is supposed to place the cost of
defective products on the manufacturer, then it is important that those
costs be accurately measured. To the extent that harm caused abroad is
not figured into those costs, the manufacturer can “absorb significant
costs associated with American accidents before the combined foreign
and domestic losses mandate a design change or the withdrawal of the
product from the American market.”192 Thus, U.S. corporations may
“avoid internalizing all of the costs imposed on others by their product,
which in turn skews economic incentives to make the product or activity safer.”193 Professor Elizabeth Lear cites this phenomenon in explaining why a U.S. corporation, facing complaints from Latin American
plaintiffs, had offered a safer product in Latin America years before
changing its United States product:
That same year, after 100 deaths and 400 accidents in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Colombia, Ford replaced the tires and
fixed the suspensions on all Ford Explorers in those countries.
Yet neither Bridgestone nor Ford initiated an American recall
until August 2000, and then only after the large number of
189 454 U.S. at 260–61 (“Respondent argues that American citizens have an interest in
ensuring that American manufacturers are deterred from producing defective products,
and that additional deterrence might be obtained if Piper and Hartzell were tried in the
United States, where they could be sued on the basis of both negligence and strict liability.
However, the incremental deterrence that would be gained if this trial were held in an
American court is likely to be insignificant.”).
190 See infra notes 191–209 and accompanying text.
191 See Lear, supra note 26, at 574; see also Alan O. Sykes, Transnational Forum Shopping as
a Trade and Investment Issue, 37 J. Legal Stud. 339, 342 (2008).
192 Lear, supra note 26, at 574.
193 Id.
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lawsuits filed in the United States attracted the attention of
the American press. In the deterrence calculus, it was apparently cost effective for Ford and Bridgestone to continue offering products they knew to be dangerous, even fatal, in the
United States for at least seven years, and more importantly,
for three years after a significant number of injuries had occurred overseas.194
Thus, the United States may very well retain a strong interest in
deterring U.S. corporations from selling harmful products abroad;
when manufacturers sell those same products in the United States, they
have less incentive to ensure their safety for the U.S. market.195 Although U.S. damages are intended to deter the sales of harmful products, companies who sell worldwide may be able to internalize the harm
caused in the American market—they profit from selling the harmful
product worldwide, but pay significant damages only when Americans
are injured.196 The profits from the sale elsewhere may be sufficient to
absorb the costs of American injuries.197
2. Political Interests
Economic concerns may also merge with political concerns in the
foreign policy arena. It makes sense that countries such as Ecuador
would protest when their citizens are unable to sue U.S. corporations in
U.S. courts. The higher damage awards available in the United States,
as well as the simplicity of enforcing a judgment in the defendant’s
home state (where assets likely reside), benefits the injured plaintiffs’
home country as well as the plaintiffs themselves.
One such benefit of a higher damage award may be a reduced dependency on the government itself. Damage awards in the United States
are higher than in other countries, in part because U.S. damage awards
must substitute for the social safety net that exists in a number of other
countries.198 In many countries, lower damage awards are offset by gov194 Id. at 576.
195 Id. 574–76.
196 See id.
197 Id. at 574.
198 Weintraub, Dispute Resolution, supra note 21, at 213; Julius Jurianto, Forum Non
Conveniens: Another Look at Conditional Dismissals, 83 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 369, 404 (2006)
(“The possibility to obtain larger damages in the United States is also due to the fact that
the amount of the damage award is likely to be keyed to the higher living standards but
lower social safety net in the United States.”).
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ernment-funded health care and other benefits.199 Thus, when U.S.
corporations injure foreign nationals, requiring the foreign plaintiffs to
sue in their home country works an injustice on that nation. The corporation is not liable for the full harm it caused; instead, the foreign state
picks up some of the expense through added burdens on the public fisc.
Although some countries may decide that the benefits of foreign investment outweigh any such risk,200 others may disagree.201
Even when the country’s social safety net itself is limited or nonexistent, the country’s government may still benefit from its citizens’
access to higher damage awards, either through the financial benefit of
tax payments or through more indirect benefits of an increased standard of living. In such a situation, it is easy to understand why other
nations may object to forum non conveniens dismissals of cases
brought by their citizens. Expecting those nations to change their own
court systems to award higher damages to all classes of plaintiffs is unrealistic; a state that has made a policy choice to enact a social safety net
is unlikely to shift responsibility to the civil justice system for the sole
reason of combatting United States dismissals. More realistically, such a
state will instead enact a more targeted blocking statute, or perhaps
allow U.S.-level damages in cases dismissed from U.S. courts.202

199 Diane P. Wood, Commentary on The Futures Problem, by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 148
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1933, 1940 (2000) (“[M]any of the problems in tort law that bedevil the
United States do not arise at all in Europe, and other problems are far less pressing, for
the simple reason that [most of] the European countries have national health insurance
systems, as well as other national ‘safety net’ payments. The individual who needs sustained
medical care because of asbestos-caused emphysema, or exposure to HIV-tainted blood, or
anything else, will get it from the state; the need to find someone else to foot crushing
hospital and doctor’s bills is different by orders of magnitude.”).
200 See Malcolm J. Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate Accountability in the Global
Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in In re: Union Carbide, Alfaro,
Sequihua, and Aguinda, 36 Tex. Int’l L.J. 299, 314 (2001) (“[G]overnments in both rich
and poor nations compete in a ‘race to the bottom’ to attract needed foreign investment.”).
201 Christopher M. Marlowe, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals and the Adequate Alternative Forum Question: Latin America, 32 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 295, 316
n.102 (2001) (“The Ecuadorian government, concerned with the [Chevron] lawsuit’s potential impact on foreign investment, first objected to U.S. jurisdiction over the case. Upon
a political shift in government, Ecuador offered to conditionally relinquish its sovereign
immunity and thus assist plaintiffs in pursuing their claims against Texaco.”).
202 Brand & Jablonski, supra note 9, at 132–39; Dante Figueroa, Conflicts of Jurisdiction
Between the United States and Latin America in the Context of Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals,
37 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 119, 156 (2005).
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Even in the absence of a specific blocking statute, there may be
foreign policy implications.203 The political history of the Americas is
marked, first by conquest and imperialism as the Spanish explorers
searched for gold centuries ago, and later by economic and political
domination by the United States.204 The long history of exploitation
remains salient in the Latin American political consciousness, and creates skepticism toward the motives of the U.S. government and of multinational corporations.205 Given the differences in history and experience, it is not surprising that a U.S. citizen and an Ecuadorian citizen
might view a case dismissal quite differently.206 Thus, although a U.S.
judge might view the decision as necessary to avoid hearing a case that
truly belongs elsewhere,207 the Ecuadorian citizen might view that same
dismissal as a partisan decision allowing U.S. corporations the chance
to operate with impunity in foreign lands.208 Such a view could result in
favoring foreign investment or trade from non-U.S. corporations, a decision that would have a significant effect on the United States both
economically and politically.209
203 See, e.g., Samuel P. Baumgartner, Is Transnational Litigation Different?, 25 U. Pa. J.
Int’l Econ. L. 1297, 1369 (2004) (noting that procedural reformists need to “act in
awareness of the complex interdependence between transnational actors and the law applicable to them,” or risk unwanted foreign policy ramifications and “unintentionally supporting patterns of individual and group behavior they may not wish to condone”).
204 Sukanya Pillay, Absence of Justice: Lessons from the Bhopal Union Carbide Disaster for Latin
America, 14 Mich. St. J. Int’l L. 479, 482 (2006); Anne McClintock, The Angel of Progress:
Pitfalls of the Term “Post-Colonialism”, 10 Soc. Text 84, 89 (1992)(“‘Post-colonial’ Latin America has been invaded by the United States over a hundred times . . . . [W]hile Latin America
hand-picked bananas for the United States, the United States hand-picked dictators for Latin
America.”); Ralph R. Reiland, Nothing “Spiritual” About Imperialism, Pittsburgh Trib. Rev.
(May 27, 2002), available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/opinion/columnists/reiland/s_510026.html.
205 Pillay, supra note 204, at 482.
206 Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naïve Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in Policy Debates, 58 Emory L.J. 499, 518–19 (2008)(citing Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril,
They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. Abnormal & Soc. Psychol. 129, 133–34 (1954) (“We
can watch a football game, a person eating a hamburger, or a couple arguing as if these are
‘things’ that are ‘out there’ to be viewed in one way; and yet what we ‘see’ is significantly
determined by influences beyond our conscious purview.”)).
207 See, e.g., DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 902 (3d Cir. 1977) (using the
phrase “social jingoism”); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842,
867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (concluding that retaining a suit arising from a gas plant disaster in
India would amount to imperialism).
208 See Pillay, supra note 204, at 517 (“Although TNCs [transnational corporations] can
make significant contributions to development, the potential for human rights violations
by TNCs is great. The Union Carbide tragedy in India remains an outstanding and terrible
example of TNC impunity.”).
209 Pillay, supra note 204, at 517; Georges Fauriol & Sidney Weintraub, U.S. Policy, Brazil, and the Southern Cone, Wash. Q., Summer 1995, at 125.
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D. Prudence and Policy in the Court-Access Doctrines
The judiciary developed prudential court-access doctrines to ensure that the administration of justice would function smoothly—to
channel cases to convenient forums, to allow courts some discretion to
dismiss cases brought for vexation and harassment, and to create a
safety valve that would allow dismissal of cases that might overwhelm
the court or embroil it in issues best handled by another institution.210
In transnational cases involving foreign plaintiffs, however, these
access doctrines have expanded in an attempt to shape substantive
rights and policy, not just to meet prudential goals. Because this shift has
remained unexamined and unacknowledged, it has created a mass of
doctrinal confusion and inconsistent application. It is unclear whether a
judge who wishes to retain a case on the docket may do so even if the
forum non conveniens factors point to dismissal. Furthermore, courts
disagree about whether the forum non conveniens doctrine is intended
to regulate litigation behavior or whether it is merely intended to adjudicate whether one forum is more suitable than another. Courts that
accept the doctrine as a means of regulation will freely dismiss cases
when the plaintiff’s own conduct has led to the unavailability of another
forum. Courts and commentators also disagree over the effects of the
court-access doctrines; in particular, they disagree about whether dismissing cases arising from the foreign conduct of domestic corporations
will have problematic effects. Some view such dismissals as respectful of
other nations’ sovereignty and a natural response to an attempt to find
the most suitable forum.211 This view, however, does not account for either the potential economic and foreign policy ramifications of such
dismissals or the protests that other nations have lodged against such
dismissals.
Accepting that the theoretical underpinnings of these court-access
doctrines have expanded from prudential administration to encompass
policy goals allows those goals to be better evaluated. The next Section
begins that process of evaluation by considering the competing goals
and choices underlying the question of transnational court access and
which institutions are best suited to develop that policy.

210 See supra notes 104–108.
211 See Union Carbide, 634 F. Supp. at 867 (“In the Court’s view, to retain the litigation in
this forum, as plaintiffs request, would be yet another example of imperialism, another
situation in which an established sovereign inflicted its rules, its standards and values on a
developing nation.”).

1114

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 51:1081

III. Comparative Institutional Choice
A number of commentators have argued for particular refinements of the forum non conveniens doctrine, any one of which would
likely improve the current incoherent state of the law in this area.212
Thus far, recent scholarship on transnational court access has largely
assumed that the judiciary—and typically at the district-court level—
should be the primary agent of reform.213 This focus on a single institution, however, is at odds with the larger academic move toward comparative institutional analysis, which addresses not only what changes
should be made to legal rules, but also who should make them: it analyzes which institution is the most appropriate vehicle for legal reform.214 Institutional choice both affects and is affected by goal choice;
social goals and institutions are “inextricably related.”215 As a result, reforming transnational court access requires attention both to the goals
underlying the doctrine and to the institution or institutions best capable of meeting them. Institutional choice theory suggests that the goals

212 Alan Reed, To Be or Not to Be: The Forum Non Conveniens Performance Acted Out on Anglo-American Courtroom Stage, 29 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 31, 60 (2000); John R. Wilson,
Coming to America to File Suit: Foreign Plaintiffs and the Forum Non Conveniens Barrier in Transnational Litigation, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 659, 690–95 (2004); Jeffrey E. Baldwin, Note, International Human Rights Plaintiffs and the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 40 Cornell Int’l
L.J. 749, 779–80 (2007); Daniel J. Dorward, Comment, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine
and the Judicial Protection of Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. Pa.
J. Int’l Econ. L. 141, 161–64 (1998); Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note, One-Way Ticket Home:
The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 Cornell L.
Rev. 650, 685–86 (1992).
213 See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text.
214 Joan MacLeod Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors: Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal
Corporate Governance Initiatives, 10 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 225, 383 (2005) (“Comparative institutional analysis is critically important to the work of scholars and other proponents of law reform. These rule proponents should not suggest changes in legal rules
without also suggesting the vehicle for the suggested reforms.”); see also Neil K. Komesar,
Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public Policy 3–13 (1994); Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who
Should Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 Ga. L. Rev. 1167,
1231–46 (2003); William W. Buzbee, Sprawl’s Dynamics: A Comparative Institutional Analysis
Critique, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 509, 529–32 (2000); Donald G. Gifford, Impersonating the
Legislature: State Attorneys General and Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 913,
961–64 (2008) (examining the respective institutional competencies of attorneys general
and the legislature), Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1424–33 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein &
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 Mich. L. Rev. 885, 886 (2003).
215 Komesar, supra note 214, at 5 (“[T]he decision as to who decides determines how a
goal shapes public policy.”).

2010]

Transnational Litigation & Institutional Choice

1115

should be articulated first, and then institutions’ competence at meeting those goals can be compared.216
A. Goals
What should be the goals of a transnational court-access policy? As
noted in the prior Section, goals may be both prudential (relating to the
efficient and fair administration of justice) and policy-oriented (relating
to substantive economic, regulatory, or foreign relations interests).
1. Prudential Goals
On the prudential side, most participants would agree that a courtaccess doctrine should promote predictability and uniformity of application. The doctrine of forum non conveniens, as currently applied, is
not very successful at shaping litigant behavior.217 A more determinate
set of court-access rules should be more successful. When litigants do
not know whether their case can go forward in a particular forum, the
resulting uncertainty causes large transaction costs as the parties must
fully litigate the question of access in each case. The lack of uniformity
also causes a basic fairness problem, as some district judges are more
likely than others to dismiss a case under similar facts. Without uniformity, success depends largely on successful forum shopping: plaintiffs who can identify more favorable district judges will be more likely
to prevail on the forum non conveniens analysis.
Some of the other prudential goals of the forum non conveniens
doctrine may still remain goals in shaping a revamped court-access doctrine. For example, one goal might be to facilitate thoughtful judicial
decision making by directing cases to the courts with the most experience dealing with the applicable law and by preventing court dockets
from becoming unmanageably crowded. Another goal might be to reduce conflicts between the branches of government, perhaps by allowing the judiciary to restrict court access in cases that prove detrimental
to the foreign relations policies of the other branches.

216 Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 569, 575–76 (2001).
217 American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 455 (1994) (discussing the difficulty
of relying on the doctrine, due to its discretionary nature and the multifariousness of its
factors).

1116

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 51:1081

2. Policy Goals
The policy goals of a transnational court-access doctrine are more
controversial. One perennial issue, of course, is whether to attempt to
reduce the “magnet effect” of U.S. courts. Although some scholars have
identified such a goal as an important aspect of transnational courtaccess policy,218 others have disagreed.219 Steering cases away from U.S.
courts may aid the prudential goals of reducing caseloads and encouraging cases to be heard in the forums most familiar with the governing
law, but it is also likely—at least in the short run—to minimize the potential liability of U.S. multinational corporations.
As discussed above, adjudicating cases brought by foreign plaintiffs
against U.S. defendants may promote U.S. interests, and thus it may be
unwise to adopt a policy of discouraging such litigation.220 One such
reason is the risk of retaliation. In the long run, other nations may continue to adopt retaliatory legislation, pulling additional litigation into
foreign courts while assessing damages at U.S. levels—or even higher.
Thus, a second policy goal is managing foreign relations to avoid
such a risk. Even in the absence of retaliatory legislation, as foreign
court systems diversify their own transnational experience and remedial
schemes, defendants may find that dismissal from U.S. courts is not the
advantage it once was. Plaintiffs may be more easily able to pursue
remedies abroad; if an aggressively limited court-access doctrine pushes
those cases out of the United States, defendants may find themselves
litigating more often in unfamiliar courts without the same due process
protections offered by the U.S. Constitution. Thus, policymakers should
consider a policy that encourages open access to U.S. courts, if only to
forestall litigation in less comfortable forums.
A third policy goal is regulating the conduct of U.S. corporations
abroad. Depending on how this policy goal is articulated, it could militate in favor of either greater or less court access for foreign plaintiffs.
If the goal is to deter U.S. companies from selling defective products or
otherwise engaging in tortious conduct abroad, then greater court ac218 See Weintraub, Dispute Resolution, supra note 21, at 225–32.
219 Kathryn Lee Boyd, The Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non Conveniens in
U.S. Human Rights Litigation, 39 Va. J. Int’l L. 41, 46 (1998) (“Given that the parties will
mostly be foreign and that the abuses will occur abroad in human rights cases, this doctrine of convenience, which focuses on the location of the evidence and parties, is a formidable obstacle for plaintiffs.”); Margaret G. Stewart, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine in
Search of a Role, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1259, 1324 (1986) (arguing that forum non conveniens
should be abolished).
220 See supra notes 182–190 and accompanying text.
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cess may be to ensure that companies pay the full cost of the harms
they cause. If, on the other hand, the goal is to promote U.S. exports
and foreign trade, then a more restrictive court-access policy may protect these interests, at least in the absence of any protest or retaliatory
effort from the affected countries.
A fourth policy goal is exporting American due process values. The
“liberal legal ideology of justice” has been described as a “prized American cultural export.”221 Although extending U.S. courts to foreign plaintiffs may cause added expense and delay in the short run, it could also
influence the development of the law in the long run. As more foreign
plaintiffs choose to sue in the United States, appreciation for American
due process protections may grow, and other court systems may integrate familiar U.S. procedures that are perceived to work well.222
Finally, a fifth policy goal is providing an effective mechanism for
corrective justice.223 At this time, the goal of corrective justice suggests a
policy of more open access to U.S. courts. As noted, foreign plaintiffs
are rarely able to obtain a legal remedy after dismissal from U.S. courts,
even if one is theoretically available.224 A desire for corrective justice may
run deeper than the instrumentalist concerns of deterrence or protecting the U.S. markets from harmful products also sold abroad; one may
also hold an “ordinary moral conception”225 that those harmed by tor221 Upendra Baxi, Inconvenient Forum and Convenient Catastrophe: The Bhopal Case 1 (1986).
222 Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 Cornell
L. Rev. 1, 14 (2008) (noting that “through migration of litigation overseas,” origin states
will “have clear evidence of their weaknesses” and thus incentive to adopt reforms). But see
id. at 21–22 (acknowledging the tensions between “exit” and “voice,” in that while an option to litigate elsewhere may improve the judicial system by increasing citizens’ calls for
reform, it may also have the opposite effect if the most influential citizens simply take their
judicial business elsewhere).
223 Jeffrey A. Van Detta, The Irony of Instrumentalism: Using Dworkin’s Principle-Rule Distinction to Reconceptualize Metaphorically a Substance-Procedure Dissonance Exemplified by Forum
Non Conveniens Dismissals in International Product Injury Cases, 87 Marq. L. Rev. 425, 441–42
(2004) (noting that “[s]cholars typically view corrective justice as a principle underlying
the substantive aims of tort law,” and explaining how regulatory principles interact with
corrective justice principles in the area of forum non conveniens).
224 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
225 See Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of Accidents, 74
S. Cal. L. Rev. 193, 193 (2000) (“Tort scholarship on the law of negligence has long been
torn between two competing conceptions. One of these conceptions—the justice conception—holds that negligence law is (and should be) an articulation of our ordinary moral
conceptions of agency and responsibility, carelessness and wrongdoing, harm and reparation. The other conception—the economic conception—holds that the law of negligence
embodies an appropriate public morality, but it takes that morality to be at best a distant
echo of the morality of responsibility and reparation found in ordinary life.”).
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tious conduct should be compensated, and if compensation is unavailable in the victim’s home country, then U.S. courts should be made
available for that purpose.
The following Section examines how our governmental institutions are likely to evaluate these varying goals, which goals are likely to
be chosen, and how they may be reconciled into a coherent courtaccess policy. It examines the comparative institutional competencies of
each branch of government and outlines how each may use its comparative strengths to develop a more effective and sustainable courtaccess policy.
B. Institutions
1. The Judiciary
As noted above, the federal district courts currently play the largest
role in transnational court access decisions. They have considerable
discretion to weigh the forum non conveniens factors set out by the
U.S. Supreme Court, and—at least when a district court decides to retain a case—that discretion is largely unreviewable. Certainly, there are
some advantages to district court discretion. To the extent that the forum non conveniens doctrine is aimed at protecting limited space on
court dockets, district court judges know the limits of their dockets better than anyone else and are in the best position to decide whether accepting a case with limited connection to their forum will cause hardship or delay to other litigants.
District court judges may also be in the best position to evaluate
litigant motives and convenience. Unlike appellate courts that must
deal with a cold record, the district court judge has considerable power
to hold preliminary hearings and to view the litigants themselves.226 In
addition, federal court judges tend to be much more insulated from
political pressures than members of the other branches.227 Given both
the insulation from political pressure and the ground-level view of the
litigants and proceedings, it has been said that “[t]he judiciary is the

226 Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 Emory L.J. 747, 761 (1982) (noting that the trial judge has a “superior opportunity to get the feel of the case”) (quoting
Noonan v. Cunard Steamship Co., 375 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1967)); Robertson, supra note
127, at 215 (“One area of trial court competence is its direct contact with witnesses.”).
227 David L. Shapiro, Courts, Legislatures, and Paternalism, 74 Va. L. Rev. 519, 555 (1988)
(“Federal judges are not elected, and in the states, where election is more common, a variety of efforts have been made to reduce the susceptibility of judges to political pressures.”).
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institution of sober second thought—the branch responsible for relating broad policy objectives to flesh-and-blood facts.”228
District court control, however, also comes with several disadvantages. Although a court might be good at applying “broad policy objectives” to specific cases, the policy objectives of the forum non conveniens doctrine are extremely imprecise. As noted in the prior Section, it
is unclear whether the doctrine is mandatory or permissive, to what
extent it should be used to punish or regulate forum shopping, and
whether it should recognize economic and foreign policy concerns.229
Although district courts may be good at applying policy objectives, they
are less capable of setting those objectives. This difficulty lies partially in
the structure of district courts, as a single judge may adopt a perfectly
reasonable policy objective, but no other judge will be obligated to follow it. Thus, without systematic appellate review, inconsistency and unpredictability are all but guaranteed.
Furthermore, a district court’s policy objectives may remain unarticulated—to the public if the judge does not write an opinion explaining his or her underlying policy assumptions, and, potentially, to the
court itself if policy assumptions exist only in the judge’s subconscious
mind.230 One scholar has argued that district judges’ tendency to dismiss cases under the doctrine of forum non conveniens suggests that
judges are making a policy decision to defer to other sovereigns’ regulatory authority by “for[going] opportunities to influence transnational
activity.”231 Yet this largely unstated assumption may just as easily cut the
other way: by dismissing cases involving U.S. defendants, judges may
indeed be “influencing transnational activity.” Specifically, they may be
shielding U.S. defendants from facing liability for transnational activity.
To the extent that either policy underlies a significant number of dismissals, however, such policies are largely unarticulated and may well
operate entirely unnoticed.232
In addition, any attempt to influence transnational activity is also
hampered by a lack of information. Scholars have noted that few judges
rely on empirical evidence of sovereign interests; instead, they tend to
rely on “simple intuitive judgment about the foreign relations conse-

228 David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 543, 585 (1985).
229 See supra notes 123–209 and accompanying text.
230 See Friendly, supra note 226, at 757 (describing “the subconscious mind-set from
which few judges are immune”).
231 Whytock, supra note 85, at 16.
232 See Robertson, supra note 74, at 371–75.
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quences” of a case disposition.233 Of course, district court judges are not
in a position to collect empirical evidence on their own, and information supplied by the parties is necessarily partisan. Nevertheless, these
case-by-case intuitive judgments hamper standardization--they have led
to “non-uniform foreign policy proclamations by the federal courts.”234
Some commentators have recommended giving the appellate
courts a more significant role in forum non conveniens rulings through
interlocutory appeals, specifically by allowing the circuit courts of appeals to review decisions retaining cases in addition to decisions dismissing cases.235 Appellate courts can offer more standardization; unlike district court rulings, which bind no other court, appellate court rulings
bind a vast swath of district court judges within their geographical region. As a result, appellate rulings can offer a greater degree of predictability and certainty to future litigants.
Although appellate courts might be a standardizing influence, they
cannot establish a full set of court-access rules all at once. Appellate
courts still analyze only one particular case at a time. Thus, if an appellate court were to consider the foreign relations implications of dismissing a case, it would look at the impact of dismissing a particular case:
would another sovereign be offended that the case had been dismissed? Occasionally, a foreign sovereign may participate in a case either as a party or an amicus, and the court can consider its position at
that time.236 Much of the foreign relations impact, however, comes not
from a particular case or a particular disposition, but rather from the
aggregate of dispositions over time. Dismissal of a single plaintiff’s case
may not cause an appreciable effect on foreign relations, but the repeated dismissal of many cases over time might cause considerably
more concern.237 An appellate court considering a single case will not
examine the aggregate impact of litigation.
233 Lumen N. Mulligan, Note, No Longer Safe at Home: Preventing the Misuse of Federal
Common Law of Foreign Relations as a Defense Tactic in Private Transnational Litigation, 100
Mich. L. Rev. 2408, 2438 (2002) (citing Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism in United
States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1395, 1414–15 (1999)).
234 Id.
235 Morin, supra note 142, at 716–19, 729–36.
236 Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534, 546–48 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (including
Ecuador as a participant in pretrial hearings); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (including India as a party).
237 See Aguinda, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 544–46. The dismissal of this very large class action
lawsuit did spark protest. See Letter from Leonidas Plaza Verduga, Attorney Gen. of Ecuador, to Janet Reno, U.S. Attorney Gen. ( Jan. 15, 1997), available at http://www.iaba.org/
LLinks_forum_non_Ecuador.htm (lodging an official complaint that the courts have used
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Furthermore, although appellate courts have a standardizing influence, appellate decisions still leave much room for inconsistency. In
areas of law where the policy goals are clear, appellate rulings may be
sufficient to clear up procedural disagreements. In the area of forum
non conveniens, however, there is so little agreement, that even in the
one area where appellate review is allowed—when a judgment of dismissal has been entered—the large number of circuit splits have made
it so that litigants can find little to help them predict how future cases
will be resolved.238 U.S. Supreme Court review could have a substantial
impact in standardizing transnational court-access policy and correcting these circuit splits, but they are currently so numerous that they
would overwhelm the Supreme Court docket.
2. Congress
Congressional action could succeed in two important ways in
which the judiciary’s case-by-case determinations cannot. First, codifying the principles of court access could provide a higher level of standardization and clarity, as a statute could proactively set out a cohesive
scheme for courts to decline jurisdiction, rather than forcing courts to
wait for issues to arise in particular cases. A number of state legislatures
have adopted forum non conveniens statutes, much as they have
adopted statutes prescribing personal jurisdiction.239 Statutory authority can clarify the factors to be considered, and can specify whether
dismissal is permissive or mandatory when the factors are met.240
The second major benefit of congressional action is that it would
provide a platform for intentional policymaking, rather than require
deference to the unacknowledged mix of prudential and policy goals
the forum non conveniens doctrine to “close the doors of American courts to citizens of
my country”).
238 See Davies, supra note 4, at 385 (“[T]here are so many conflicts between circuit
courts of appeal on forum non conveniens issues that the Supreme Court could grant
certiorari to consider any or all of these issues almost at any time it desires.”); J. Clifford
Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a
Molehill?, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 913, 930 (1983) (concluding that circuit splits “encourag[e] tactical ploys designed to avoid the unfavorable approach of one circuit or take advantage of
the favorable approach of another circuit”).
239 See, e.g., Ala. Code § 6–5–430 (2005); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 71.051(b)
(2008); Wis. Stat. § 801.63 (2008); see also other statutes cited in Weintraub, International
Litigation, supra note 21, at 345 n.188.
240 See In re Gen. Elec. Co., 271 S.W.3d 685–87, 686 (Tex. 2008) (noting that the Texas
legislature had amended the forum non conveniens statute to provide that the district
judge “shall” dismiss when the factors are met, whereas the prior statute had provided that
the judge “may” dismiss).
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articulated by the judiciary.241 Such a platform would also include substantial resources devoted to that task.242 Although judicial decisions
dismissing cases under the forum non conveniens doctrine certainly
have policy implications, they do not provide the same institutional legitimacy that lawmaking by Congress could provide.243 As others have
noted, because the very function of the legislative branch is to debate
and determine policy, Congress’s institutional competence in the policymaking arena is unparalleled: “The Congress is elected to make policy, and its members campaign on what kind of policy decisions they
propose to make. There is active and partisan debate about those decisions . . . .”244
The lawmaking process is also much more open to outside participation than the judicial branch. Whereas judges are more likely to rely
on heuristics such as territoriality as a proxy for actually gathering information about the “preferences and decisions of other political actors,”245 the lawmaking process is specifically designed to encourage
input from those affected by its decisions: “Congress, functioning
through committees, solicits the views of all concerned about decisions
to be made. Experts are consulted who offer all kinds of testimony and
material as to how policy should be crafted. Moreover, every special interest makes sure that its interests are addressed.”246
Finally, Congress can set court-access fees at a level that ensures the
U.S. judiciary will not be financially burdened by litigation arising elsewhere. One of the oft-stated concerns that supports a robust doctrine
of forum non conveniens is the need to ensure that taxpayers whose
dollars support court operations are not unduly burdened.247 Congress
can, by statute, require foreign litigants to pay higher fees in cases that
241 See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
242 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 Va. L. Rev.
1617, 1682 (1997) (“Furthermore, Congress has special committees and subcommittees
with permanent staffs devoted to monitoring various aspects of the United States’ relations
with foreign countries.”).
243 Shapiro, supra note 227, at 551 (“It is possible for courts to do many of the things
that legislatures do, and vice-versa. Yet there comes a point when the effort involves a considerable strain on the institution in question—when it is clear that one branch is doing
something that is done far better, or with a good deal more legitimacy, by the other.”).
244 Abner J. Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to Professor Neal Katyal, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1825, 1828 (1998).
245 Whytock, supra note 85, at 13.
246 Mikva, supra note 244, at 1828.
247 See Barrett, supra note 61, at 404; see also One Hundred & Ninety-Four Shawls, 18 F.
Cas. 703, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1848) (No. 10,521) (concluding that courts should not prioritize
cases involving litigants “owing no allegiance to its laws, and contributing in no way to its
support”).
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might otherwise be dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.248 A variable fee structure would reduce costs in two ways: first,
in a direct way through externalizing the cost of hearing foreign cases,
and second, indirectly through avoiding the cost of an initial hearing.
Right now, even dismissals under the doctrine of forum non conveniens impose costs in the initial hearing and in any enforcement action
after the case is tried elsewhere.249 With congressional authorization,
however, fees could be set at level to recoup the actual cost of litigation
and thereby avoid the need for local taxpayer subsidization.250
Congress’s most significant disadvantage—its vulnerability to interest-group capture—is the flip side of its advantage in openness and
participation.251 It is easy to imagine that a statute regulating foreigners’ access to U.S. courts would tilt strongly toward parochial interests
and support U.S. multinationals’ desire to avoid American courts. Such
a result is not guaranteed; after all, at the time such legislation is proposed, future litigation is likely speculative, and a more generous courtaccess policy might encourage other countries to allow greater direct
investment and corporate activity.252 Multinational corporations acting
behind a veil of ignorance may not know whether the risk of unwanted
U.S. lawsuits is likely to outweigh the benefits of opening access to new
markets.253 Not all corporations, however, operate behind such a veil.
In particular, large oil and gas or agricultural entities may rightly suspect that their operations are particularly likely to be targeted in large

248 Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 222, at 64–65.
249 See Casey & Ristroph, supra note 93, at 41.
250 See Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 222, at 64–65.
251 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural Perspective,
77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 35–36 (2008) (“[C]apture appears particularly relevant for Congress . . . . [T]he quid pro quo is fairly straightforward: elected officials want campaign
contributions, and powerful interests are in a position to help deliver them. And, not surprisingly, many commentators now believe that Congress is particularly subject to quid pro
quo influence by powerful incumbent interests.”); Lloyd H. Mayer, The Much Maligned 527
and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. Rev. 625, 652 (2007) (noting that narrowly targeted
initiatives may be especially vulnerable to interest-group capture).
252 See Brooke Clagett, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens in International Environmental
Tort Suits: Closing the Doors of the U.S. Courts to Foreign Plaintiffs, 9 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 513, 522
(1996) (“U.S. multinational corporations will continue to injure the environment in developing countries whose needs for foreign investment appear greater than their interest
in preserving a healthy natural environment for their own citizens.”).
253 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 118–23 (1975) (developing the concept of a
‘veil of ignorance,’ which asks what societal rules parties would make if they were forced to
act without knowledge of whether those rules would prove beneficial or detrimental to
them personally).
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transnational lawsuits.254 As a result, they are likely to lobby heavily for a
limited court-access doctrine.
Assuming that Congress is likely to adopt such a restrictive policy,
are the benefits worth the risks of legislative action? For those who support a restrictive access policy in general, the answer is clearly yes.255 Yet
even those who support more openness may be willing to accept the risk
of restrictive congressional action. First, the benefits that stem from
predictability are not insignificant. If parties know at the outset that
court access is strictly limited, they can plan accordingly; such legislation
in the United States may encourage other countries to adopt legislation
allowing higher damages awards, much like the Parlatino model.256 In
addition, such legislation could provide a firm target for lobbying Congress: if, indeed, there is international opposition to such legislation, it
would not be unusual to revisit the issue again. As others have pointed
out, Congress is in a much better position than the courts “to experiment, to monitor the results, and to revise the experiment in the light of
those results.”257 Finally, legislative action does not foreclose the possibility of executive action through treaty negotiation—in fact, even highly
restrictive court-access legislation may function as a starting point for
bilateral or multilateral conventions.
3. Executive Branch
Given that the executive branch generally has the largest role in
foreign relations, it is somewhat surprising that it has had only a small
role in articulating transnational court-access policies. The executive
branch, however, has not been entirely without influence; its participation in individual cases as well as its treaty-making powers guarantee
that the executive branch has a role in ensuring that federal courts’
openness to litigation comports with U.S. interests in the foreign policy
arena.
When an individual case is clearly important enough to influence
foreign relations, the executive branch will share its views with the fo-

254 Dole Food Co., for example, has been the frequent target of lawsuits based on
events occurring in Central America and has funded legal research on the subject of the
forum non conveniens doctrine. See Scott, supra note 157, at 103–04 (arguing in favor of
mandatory dismissal of cases brought by foreign plaintiffs against U.S. defendants in federal court based on conduct abroad) (research funded by Dole Food Co.).
255 See id.
256 See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text.
257 Shapiro, supra note 227, at 555.
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rum court.258 U.S. courts have been quite receptive to executive branch
participation in comparable matters; in foreign sovereign immunity
cases, for example, the Supreme Court noted that it has “‘consistently
. . . deferred to the decisions of the political branches—in particular,
those of the Executive Branch—on whether to take jurisdiction’ over
particular actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities.”259 Thus, in a case of extraordinary importance, the executive
branch may file an amicus brief or otherwise present its views to the
forum court.
A more systematic executive influence arises through the treatymaking power. Treaties are considered equivalent to statutes as sources
of governing law.260 Since 1775—even before the Declaration of Independence was signed—the United States has entered into commercial
treaties that gave foreign nationals some access to U.S. courts.261 Today,
the United States has bilateral “Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation” (FCN) treaties with a large number of countries, and many of
those treaties provide access to U.S. courts on the same terms as U.S.
citizens.262 As a result, some courts have held that any forum non conveniens analysis involving a plaintiff from a treaty member state cannot
treat the foreign plaintiff any less deferentially than the court would
treat a U.S. resident plaintiff.263 Other courts have interpreted such
258 See 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2006) (“The Solicitor General, or any officer of the Department of Justice, may be sent by the Attorney General to any State or district in the United
States to attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending in a court of the
United States, or in a court of a State, or to attend to any other interest of the United
States.”).
259 Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 689 (2004) (quoting Verlinden B.V. v.
Cen. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)).
260 Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs 63 (1990)
(“[I]n case of conflict between a statute and a treaty the one which is later in time prevails”).
261 See Allan Jay Stevenson, Forum Non Conveniens and Equal Access Under Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation Treaties: A Foreign Plaintiff’s Rights, 13 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L.
Rev. 267, 281 (1990) (“The treaty provided that ‘inhabitants of the territories’ of each
party were to have ‘free access’ to the courts of justice of the other party for prosecuting
suits for recovery of their property, paying debts, and satisfying their damages.”) (citing
Robert R. Wilson, Access-to-Courts Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties, 47 Am. J.
Int’l L. 20, 33 (1953)).
262 Id. at 267, 281.
263 See, e.g., Blanco v. Banco Indus. de Venez., S.A., 997 F.2d 974, 981 (2d Cir. 1993)
(“Because such a treaty exists between the United States and Venezuela, no discount may
be imposed upon the plaintiff’s initial choice of a New York forum in this case solely because Proyecfin is a foreign corporation.”); Irish Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739
F.2d 90, 92 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Because of the existence of the two international compacts,
the district court should have applied the same forum non conveniens standards that it would
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treaties more narrowly, however, holding that the treaties require only
that foreign citizens be treated similarly to U.S. citizens residing
abroad—and that neither category of plaintiff should be accorded
much deference in the forum non conveniens analysis.264 It is clear that
the treaties are open to more than one interpretation. The existence of
the treaties themselves, however, speaks to executive branch interest in
foreign citizens’ access to U.S. courts. If the executive branch and U.S.
treaty partners believe that the treaties are being interpreted too narrowly, they can negotiate clarifications to more explicitly address access
standards and the role of forum non conveniens.
The United States has also participated in negotiations for a number of multilateral conventions that bear on the question of court access and, specifically, on forum non conveniens. The proposed Hague
Judgments Convention dealt with forum non conveniens explicitly, offering a compromise between the civil law tradition of lis pendens and
the common law tradition of forum non conveniens.265 Ultimately,
however, the convention failed,266 and a less ambitious choice-of-court
convention was adopted in its stead; this convention allows parties to
include a choice-of-court clause in commercial contracts and ensures
have applied to a United States citizen.”); Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp. 796, 800
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (“The Treaty provides for similar treatment in like situations; clearly it
affords Irish citizens no greater rights than those afforded to United States citizens.”).
264 Varnelo v. Eastwind Transp., No. 02 Civ. 2084, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1424, at *44
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2003) (“Thus, a foreign plaintiff residing overseas should receive the
same diminished degree of deference as would be accorded an expatriate U.S. citizen living abroad.”); In re Dow Corning Corp., 255 B.R. 445, 527 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (“The FCN
treaties afford the foreign party equal access to the courts only. The FCN treaties do not
preclude a court from dismissing a claim based on . . . the forum non conveniens doctrine. If
a domestic plaintiff was faced with a forum non conveniens motion in a court, that court is
not barred from dismissing that plaintiff’s case just because the plaintiff is from another
state.”).
265 See Stuckelberg, supra note 54, at 961 (“In the negotiation in The Hague, the questions of forum non conveniens and lis pendens were linked together, the former being the
traditional common law rule for declining jurisdiction, the latter being the civil law rule
on the subject. The flexibility of the former and the predictability of the latter had to be
combined to find a solution agreeable to both legal traditions.”); see also Christopher Tate,
Note, American Forum Non Conveniens in Light of the Hague Convention on Choice-of-Court
Agreements, 69 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 165, 168 (2007) (criticizing the convention’s rejection of
forum non conveniens).
266 See Stuckelberg, supra note 54, at 967–68 (describing the controversy surrounding
forum non conveniens at the Hague convention and noting that common law countries
perceive the doctrine “as an indispensable tool for a fair exercise of justice . . . in particular, a way to fight against forum-shopping,” while civil law countries, by contrast, “are afraid
of this new exception offered to the defendants; which increases the duration and the
costs of civil litigation. They deplore the absence of predictability of the doctrine and its
discretionary character.”).
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that courts in each of the signatory nations will enforce such clauses.267
If the convention is ratified, forum non conveniens would no longer be
an issue in cases arising under such contracts; parties could specify by
contract which court, or courts, should be deemed convenient, and
courts in member nations would be obligated to follow that ruling.268
Until now, the executive branch has had little direct involvement
in forum non conveniens issues. Yet, given the increasing recognition
that the court-access doctrine implicates U.S. foreign interests, executive branch participation may well increase. The United States can intervene in particular cases if they are individually significant. Otherwise, the treatymaking power offers a more systematic approach to ensuring access to U.S. courts.
C. Combining Institutional Strengths
Each branch of government possesses relative institutional strengths
and weaknesses. If the branches work together, however, they may be
able to articulate a more coherent approach to court access that improves upon the current chaos of the forum non conveniens doctrine.
Reform should begin in Congress: Congress’s experience in weighing
difficult policy choices, ensuring participation of all interested parties,
and legislating proactively all suggest that it should take the lead in articulating a court-access doctrine. This policy debate should explicitly
consider U.S. interests in opening federal courts to suits by foreign plaintiffs. Congress can, and should, consider the economic and regulatory
interests in having U.S. courts decide cases involving the foreign conduct
of domestic corporations.
Ideally, forum non conveniens legislation would open the federal
courts to cases brought by foreign plaintiffs. A closed system may save
administrative costs and may protect U.S. corporate defendants in the
short run.269 Yet it also creates a significant risk of retaliation, encouraging other countries to create mechanisms to hold U.S. corporations
accountable for the harms they cause abroad—and, perhaps, to hold

267 Brand & Jablonski, supra note 9, at 147–48. The United States had signed the convention but not yet ratified it. Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, Status
Table, Hague Conf. on Private Int’l L., http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=
conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited Aug. 3, 2010).
268 See Jeffrey Talpis & Nick Krnjevic, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements
of June 30, 2005: The Elephant That Gave Birth to a Mouse, 13 Sw. J. L. & Trade Am. 1, 17–20
(2006).
269 See Barrett, supra note 61, at 405.
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them accountable with much higher damages than they would face in
the United States, and without U.S.-style due process protections.270
An open system avoids this risk and offers several other benefits.
First, it provides an opportunity to regulate the conduct of U.S. corporations, which may be particularly important when that conduct affects
U.S. residents as well as nonresidents. In addition, openness to foreign
plaintiffs advertises the advantages of the U.S. justice system, and may
encourage the export of U.S. due process protections.271 As business
becomes ever more global, U.S. parties are likely to benefit from justice
systems influenced by the U.S. system. Finally, an open court system
would help ensure the availability of corrective justice when harms occur.272 At this time, the remedies available elsewhere are still more
theoretical than real; an open court system in the U.S. facilitates redress.
Although the mechanics of open-access legislation are less important than the existence of such legislation, it is nevertheless helpful to
examine what such a statute might look like. I propose that the statute
should provide, at a minimum, that U.S. district courts presumptively
accept a case against U.S. resident defendants as long as jurisdiction
and venue are satisfied. Dismissal should be allowed only upon a finding both that another forum is available in another country and that
the defendant would be unable to present its defenses in the U.S. due
to difficulties in obtaining evidence or establishing jurisdiction over
parties or witnesses located elsewhere. Given concerns about cost and
administrative burden, such legislation might be tied to a higher fee
schedule that allows such cases to proceed without taxpayer subsidy.273
Although the benefits of open access outweigh its detriments, it is
possible that Congress would be persuaded by constituent corporations
to create a more restrictive court-access doctrine. Such legislation
might function similarly (but with opposite effect) to the one described
above; for example, it might presumptively dismiss cases brought by
foreign plaintiffs that involve actions occurring outside the United
States.274 The possibility of such legislation is not an argument against
270 Anderson, supra note 88, at 182; Oxman, supra note 88, at 128.
271 See Dammann & Hansmann, supra note 222, at 14 (noting that “through migration
of litigation overseas,” origin states will “have clear evidence of their weaknesses” and thus
incentive to adopt reforms).
272 See Van Detta, supra note 223, at 441–42 (explaining how regulatory principles interact with corrective justice principles in the area of forum non conveniens).
273 See Barrett, supra note 61, at 404 (discussing burdens on taxpayers).
274 See Scott, supra note 157, at 102–04 (recommending a federal statute that mandates
such dismissal).
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congressional intervention. Such restrictive legislation, although shortsighted, may still offer substantial benefits of certainty and predictability and therefore provide at least incremental improvement over the
current haphazard doctrine.
Restrictive legislation could also provide a default rule subject to
modification through treaty. If indeed congressional policy is overly
parochial and too deferential to U.S. corporate interests, then the executive branch can take the lead in developing bilateral and multilateral treaties ensuring access to courts. Individual countries could negotiate such treaties bilaterally as part of trade negotiations; perhaps as a
condition of allowing more U.S. investment, countries might insist that
their citizens be granted access to U.S. courts for torts arising out of the
conduct of U.S. defendants and that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should not apply in such a case. Although the executive branch
may not want to encroach upon congressional action, it is also not formally bound by such action; a later-enacted treaty will trump previous
legislation.275
In any case, even if Congress has set a restrictive default rule, it
may not object to more specific treaties enacted in response to international political negotiation. After all, if the executive branch negotiates
bilateral court-access treaties only with specific countries that have objected to a restrictive court-access policy, such treaty-based exceptions
may be individualized enough that Congress does not perceive them as
an obstacle to a generally restrictive policy. Furthermore, if an individual country has objected to restrictive court access, that objection may
signal that the country is likely to enact retaliatory legislation. Congress—and its affected constituents—may strongly prefer that such
countries are exempted from restrictive court-access statutes.
The executive branch can also continue to negotiate multilateral
conventions. Although the Hague Judgments Convention failed to pass,
the need for standardized enforcement of judgments is great enough
that future efforts to renew such an agreement are likely. If the parties
are negotiating under a framework where the default court-access rules
have been codified, then expectations may be framed accordingly:
other parties may have a greater understanding of the U.S. policy once
it has been articulated by a legislative body, and to the extent that

275 Henkin, supra note 260, at 63.
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changes to that policy can be negotiated, they will have a clear starting
point for discussion.276
Finally, even with legislative—and perhaps executive—action, judicial discretion will still play a role. Once the court-access policies have
been set, district judges can apply them more easily than the multifactor considerations they now apply. And even a well-articulated and
open-access legislative policy should still leave some room for judicial
discretion. Because of district courts’ proximity to litigants and witnesses, Congress may want to defer to district court discretion in allowing judges to dismiss individual cases when the court concludes that the
plaintiff is abusing the legal process, or when the State Department intervenes to seek dismissal due to a specific foreign-relations matter.277
With congressional guidance about what factors to apply, courts can
more easily determine the adequacy of particular alternative forums;
the court can hear testimony and develop an individual case record in a
way that no other branch can do. Judicial discretion is likely to be enhanced by input from the other branches: because the courts will not
need to re-create policy in each decision, judges can focus on the primary judicial strength of “relating broad policy objectives to flesh-andblood facts.”278
Conclusion
Scholars, courts, and commentators agree that the current courtaccess doctrines are confused, chaotic, and in need of reform. Until
now, however, reform has proved to be an elusive goal. That may now
be changing. In the past, dismissal from a U.S. court often represented
a win for defendants, as foreign plaintiffs rarely attempted to re-file the
cases abroad. Yet, as other countries have begun to enact retaliatory
legislation that allows such cases to go forward with U.S.-level (or
greater) damage awards, multinational corporations face a real threat
of liability. In the Aguinda case cited at the beginning of this Article, for
example, Chevron might have preferred to face liability in U.S. courts
rather than the $27 billion judgment that was recommended in the Ecuadorian court. Because domestic corporations can no longer rely on
276 See Samuel P. Baumgartner, The Proposed Hague Convention on Jurisdiction
and Foreign Judgments 192 (2003) (noting that transnational procedural standardization has suffered from a “lack of information about the respective approaches on the other
side of the Atlantic Ocean and the jurisprudential preferences underlying them” and suggesting that there is a strong need for “a better mutual understanding”).
277 See Robertson, supra note 74, at 379.
278 Shapiro, supra note 228, at 585.
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court-access doctrines to insulate them from liability in transnational
cases, they may be more willing to join the call for reform.
Traditionally, most scholarship has had a “single institution” focus
on the judiciary as the agent of such reform. Such a focus is short
sighted and does not accommodate the growing importance of transnational legal and business activity. Reform will be best accomplished
when all three branches take an active role: Congress in articulating an
initial court-access policy, the executive branch in negotiating bilateral
treaties and multilateral court-access conventions, and the judiciary in
applying these policies to individual cases.
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